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Cryptoport Port MCP Server

FinanceModerate5.2MCP RegistryLocalRemote
Free

Server data from the Official MCP Registry

Daily board of what crypto YouTube channels said: coin calls, stances, catalysts. Free, no key.

About

Daily board of what crypto YouTube channels said: coin calls, stances, catalysts. Free, no key.

Remote endpoints: streamable-http: https://cryptoport-mcp.cryptoport-port.workers.dev/mcp

Security Report

5.2
Moderate5.2Moderate Risk

The Crypto Port is a well-architected MCP server with strong security gates and thoughtful permission scoping. However, several moderate-severity issues reduce confidence: the server fetches OFAC SDN lists from external sources without pinning/verification, stores testnet private keys in env files despite safeguards, relies on external x402 facilitators without built-in resilience, and has incomplete test coverage for critical security paths. The codebase demonstrates security-first design but lacks hardening for production scenarios. Supply chain analysis found 3 known vulnerabilities in dependencies (0 critical, 1 high severity).

6 files analyzed · 13 issues found

Security scores are indicators to help you make informed decisions, not guarantees. Always review permissions before connecting any MCP server.

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HTTP Network Access

Connects to external APIs or services over the internet.

env_vars

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File System Read

Reads files on your machine. Normal for tools that analyze or process local data.

How to Install & Connect

Available as Local & Remote

This plugin can run on your machine or connect to a hosted endpoint. during install.

Documentation

View on GitHub

From the project's GitHub README.

The Crypto Port — MCP server

What crypto YouTube channels said, as a daily board — coin calls, stances, dated catalysts — served over MCP. Free, no API key.

  • Live endpoint (streamable HTTP): https://cryptoport-mcp.cryptoport-port.workers.dev/mcp
  • Registry name: com.thecryptoport/cryptoport-port (official MCP registry, registry.modelcontextprotocol.io)
  • Website (the human board): https://thecryptoport.com

Add to your client

Claude Code:

claude mcp add --transport http cryptoport https://cryptoport-mcp.cryptoport-port.workers.dev/mcp

Any MCP client that speaks streamable-HTTP remotes:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "cryptoport": {
      "type": "streamable-http",
      "url": "https://cryptoport-mcp.cryptoport-port.workers.dev/mcp"
    }
  }
}

Free tools: latest_board, search. Everything served is commentary on public statements by named channels; every payload carries stale / stale_days / built_from_brief_date — read them. Not financial advice, not real-time.


Build context — the rung-3 machine port

MCP server + x402-payable HTTP endpoints over thecryptoport.com's daily board.

Network: Base Sepolia (eip155:84532) — testnet, throughout. No mainnet sign-off exists and none is assumed. Nothing is charged in real money on any network this server talks to. Master's ruling of record for this build is C+ (2026-08-24): build the paid-port mechanics now on testnet only; the paid tier itself stays declined and the mainnet switch is the day-60 ruling. The prices below exist so the payment handshake is real, not because anyone is billed.

Runtime owner: Dex. Ward wrote the money, screening and licensing logic; Dex stands the process up and keeps it alive. See "Handoff to Dex" below.


What it is

ToolPrice (testnet USDC)HTTP twin
latest_boardfreeGET /api/v1/board
search(q, limit)freeGET /api/v1/search?q=
coin(ticker)0.005GET /api/v1/coin/:ticker
stance_history(ticker)0.01GET /api/v1/stance_history/:ticker
catalysts(window)0.01GET /api/v1/catalysts?window=
board_snapshot(date)0.02 — not charged todayGET /api/v1/board_snapshot/:date

Free meta: GET /healthz, GET /x402/routes (the price table), GET /.well-known/mcp.json. MCP: POST /mcp (streamable HTTP) and npm run mcp-stdio (stdio).

The MCP tools are thin proxies onto the HTTP twins inside the same process. One code path for pricing, screening, refusal and the published-field gate, so the two surfaces cannot disagree.

What the paid tier actually sells — read this before pricing anything

llms.txt says, in the site's own words: "there is no hidden paid tier of the same rows." That sentence is a constraint on this build, and it holds: every paid payload names the free static file the same facts live in (upstream). What is priced is form, not exclusivity — a parsed dated series instead of an arc string, a windowed catalyst query instead of a full file. If a future paid tool ever returns a fact the free tier does not, that llms.txt line becomes false and has to change first. → flagged to Larry, not decided here.


Run it

npm install
npm run sdn-refresh          # refresh the OFAC list (vendored copy already present)
node scripts/keygen.js       # writes .env.sepolia (mode 600); prints only the address
X402_PAY_TO=0x… npm start    # http://localhost:8402
npm test                     # 50 tests
npm run demo                 # free call -> 402 -> (pay) -> data + receipt

Data comes from the rung-0 emitter: CRYPTOPORT_DATA_DIR, else <repo>/../../Documents/Claude/myPKA/infra/cryptoport-site/dist, falling back to staging when dist has no feed.json. It is read once at boot into memory — the request path never touches the filesystem, which is what makes src/worker.js (Cloudflare Workers) a deployment choice rather than a rewrite.

Claude Code MCP config (stdio)

{ "mcpServers": { "thecryptoport": {
  "command": "node",
  "args": ["/home/ops/projects/cryptoport-port/src/mcp-stdio.js"],
  "env": { "X402_PAY_TO": "0x…" }
} } }

Streamable HTTP instead: point the client at http://localhost:8402/mcp.


Mechanism chosen, and what was rejected

Chosen: x402 v2 middleware in front of the paid routes + the free public testnet facilitator

  • USDC on Base Sepolia. No smart contract, no bytecode of any kind. A price, a receive address and a verifier are the whole mechanism, and fewer contracts is a security property.
RejectedWhy
A bespoke access/subscription contractPure audit surface for something x402 does natively per call.
A self-hosted facilitatorRight idea, wrong scale. Buys decentralisation we do not need and adds a service to keep alive.
API keys + StripeReintroduces accounts, PII and an operator in the loop; wrong shape for anonymous agents.
Any token, subscription NFT or fractionalised instrumentPre-CLARITY securities exposure for zero benefit. Hard no.
@x402/paywall (a peer dep of @x402/hono)Installs 716 packages including WalletConnect, for a browser paywall UI no agent will ever see. @x402/hono works without it; verified.

Header names are read out of @x402/core, not transcribed from a blog: request X-PAYMENT, response X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE, and the 402 carries the terms in the payment-required header (base64 JSON) — the terms are also repeated in the JSON body so an agent does not have to base64-decode a header to learn a price. Package generation matters: the scoped @x402/* v2 packages are pinned in package.json and coexist on npm with the v1 x402-hono/x402-next.

No license is signed and no license hash is referenced here. This rung sells access to a compilation of public statements; there is no geometry, no licensable work product, and no EIP-712 typed-data license in the design. The license string in every payload is rung 0's own attribution notice, passed through untouched.


Gates (all three run before anything is served)

  1. Advisory-input refusal — src/inputs.js. Any argument named like portfolio / holdings / position / allocation / balance / risk profile / cost basis / PnL / leverage / stop-loss / "should I buy" is refused with 400 and a plain reason, on HTTP and MCP alike, before payment is even considered. Values are never inspected — we refuse the shape, we do not read the data. Every tool description says so.
  2. OFAC SDN denied-party screening on the payer — src/sdn.js. A local check of every 0x… address found anywhere in the decoded X-PAYMENT payload against OFAC's published SDN digital-currency address list (991 addresses, 124 EVM, published 08/24/2026), fetched read-only by scripts/sdn-refresh.js from OFAC's own endpoint and vendored as data/sdn-addresses.json. A listed payer gets 403, is never settled and is never served. Not KYT: it screens the paying address, it does not trace funds. No KYC, no accounts, no PII — collecting identity for a $0.005 data call creates a worse surface than it mitigates.
  3. B-2 published-field gate — src/allowlist.js. quality, counterweight, rank and presence never leave the process, however they are spelled, and any undeclared key raises too. The held-back list has one source of truth — infra/cryptoport-site/allowlist.py — and test/allowlist-parity.test.js fails if the two drift. Upstream rows are projected on load, so a widened emitter cannot silently widen this surface.

Proof the gates can fail (the point of having them): test/sdn.test.js refuses a genuinely OFAC-listed address end-to-end over HTTP, then removes that one address from the list and asserts the same call is not refused — so the 403 is demonstrably coming from the gate and not from somewhere else. test/b2-leak.test.js injects each held-back column into the upstream JSON and asserts every tool either raises or projects it away, and that the HTTP surface answers 500 with no leaked value in the body.


Wallet surface

  • One receive-only address as payTo. It signs nothing, holds no approvals, calls no contract. The server does not need its key and refuses to start if any *PRIVATE_KEY / *RECOVERY_KEY / MNEMONIC / SEED_PHRASE variable is present in its environment (test/network-guard.test.js).
  • Testnet throwaway EOA, per the ~/projects/cad-on-chain/scripts/keygen.js pattern, with one change: the key is written straight to .env.sepolia (mode 600) and never printed. stdout ends up in terminals, transcripts and session logs, and "no private key in a repo, a note or a log" has no testnet exemption.
  • It does not graduate. A mainnet payTo is a CDP-managed Server Wallet or it does not exist.
  • Chain id 84532 is hard-guarded and every mainnet id is denylisted by name.
  • Non-custodial by construction: no buyer funds, no buyer keys, no buyer files, no refunds (settlement precedes delivery), and no file custody, ever.

Mainnet gate list (verbatim from the Lane C spec §C7 — all must be true, none inferred)

  1. Master's explicit per-deployment mainnet sign-off, quoted verbatim in the deliverable.
  2. Paid-tier ruling reopened and granted.
  3. Pax/Master answers on §C5 (a)–(d), especially the investment-adviser question.
  4. payTo is a CDP-managed account; no key material anywhere on disk; the throwaway-EOA pattern retired.
  5. SDN denied-party gate demonstrated rejecting a listed address.
  6. B-2 leak test green in CI, and demonstrated failing when a held-back column is introduced.
  7. Facilitator switched from x402.org (testnet-only) to CDP with credentials held outside the repo.
  8. Ownership/receipt question settled on a domain that is not Master's.
  9. No new bytecode — if that changes, Slither + Foundry fuzz/invariant in CI and a named external audit before mainnet.

Status against that list today: 5 and 6 are done and demonstrated. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 are untouched. 9 holds — this build ships no bytecode, so no Slither/Foundry pass and no external audit is required; if that ever changes, item 9 applies in full.


Handoff to Dex (runtime requirements, not a runtime decision)

  • Uptime. It must survive a reboot unattended, with no permanent operator clicks. On the box that means a systemd unit — gated live config → Master. Ward did not create one.
  • Secrets. The process needs exactly one variable: X402_PAY_TO. It needs no key. Hold it outside any repo. .env.sepolia / .env.buyer are mode-600 and git-ignored and the server never reads them.
  • Cold start. The whole board is read once at boot (~60 JSON files, tens of ms). On Workers, supply the same shape from KV via src/worker.js (env.BOARD keys: feed, coins, catalysts, sdn) and pushed by the 07:50 cron. No Cloudflare account was created for this — the file exists so the runtime choice stays a deployment decision.
  • Outbound HTTPS to https://x402.org/facilitator on every paid call (1–2 subrequests). The datacenter-egress problem on this box is inbound reputation at YouTube, not outbound HTTPS.
  • Data. Point CRYPTOPORT_DATA_DIR at whatever the 07:50 job emits. The port re-reads only at boot; restart it after the emit, or add a reload.
  • SDN refresh on the same cron: npm run sdn-refresh (read-only fetch from OFAC, ~30 s).
  • Rate limiting on the free tier is an edge concern → Dex. The paid tier is self-limiting.
  • Anchoring stays rung 1 → Dex. The port consumes anchors and passes them through untouched; it never re-anchors, re-hashes or forks the passport record. Note: the current dist build carries anchor.root = null while staging has real Merkle roots — the deployed build is un-anchored. The server prints a warning at boot and serves the empty anchor faithfully. That is Dex's to fix, not Ward's.
  • Registry submission — DONE. Listed as com.thecryptoport/cryptoport-port on registry.modelcontextprotocol.io via HTTP domain proof (root server.json, scripts/registry-publish.sh).

Cost

Expect ~$0. Free testnet facilitator, free registry listing, testnet USDC, existing hosting, no contract, no vendor. The only recurring cost that ever appears is CDP's $0.001 per settlement above 1,000/month at mainnet, which at any realistic volume for this board is zero. Revenue expectation is also ~$0: at the ecosystem median a thousand paid calls a month is about $28; at these prices, $5–10. This lane is a demo of the stack and an option on a rail.

Known limitations and confidence flags

  • Bazaar discovery does not work on testnet — CONFIRMED 2026-08-24. The free x402.org facilitator's /supported advertises ['builder-code','eip2612GasSponsoring','erc20ApprovalGasSponsoring'] — no bazaar — and GET /facilitator/discovery/resources returns 404. Our 402s carry a valid bazaar declaration (registry/bazaar-mcp.json, and test/x402.test.js asserts it), but nothing indexes it. A real Bazaar listing needs the CDP facilitator, which needs an account. This contradicts the "Bazaar day one" line in the Lane C spec §C3 and is a mainnet-gate item.
  • The demo stops at the 402. Both throwaway addresses hold 0 testnet USDC, and Base Sepolia faucets require a human login. No bot-wall was attempted. Everything up to settlement is proven; the remaining step is one human faucet visit, then npm run demo again.
  • MCP registry manifest is the root server.json; it validates against the live registry schema and is what scripts/registry-publish.sh publishes. (The earlier unused draft at registry/server.json was removed 2026-08-30.)
  • board_snapshot is a stub and is deliberately not charged while it is one: no anchored historical board series exists yet.
  • Settlement metadata arrives in the X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE header, not the response body, because the SDK settles after the handler has already written the body. The MCP layer merges it into the payload as settlement; HTTP callers read the header. Documented rather than worked around.
  • stance_history derives from the published arc string. If rung 0 ever stops publishing arc, this tool has nothing to parse.
  • Ward writes no client-facing copy. The disclaimer sentence in every payload is engineering boilerplate about what an anchor does and does not prove — Rhea/Pax to ratify the wording.

Open questions for Pax / Master (flagged, not decided)

Unchanged from the Lane C spec §C5: (a) does charging for a summarised feed of named channels' calls change the attribution / derivative-work posture; (b) is a paid crypto-calls feed exposed to investment-adviser framing that the free board is not; (c) money-transmission characterization of receiving USDC for data; (d) may the seven channel names appear in a paid product. None of these are answered, and this build charges nobody.

Files

src/config.js       env + the chain-id guard + the no-keys-in-env rule
src/allowlist.js    B-2 gate (mirrors infra/cryptoport-site/allowlist.py)
src/data.js         snapshot, freshness, arc parsing, search — pure, Workers-safe
src/inputs.js       advisory-input refusal
src/sdn.js          OFAC SDN screening
src/tools.js        the one tool table: prices, schemas, descriptions, handlers
src/x402-routes.js  route config, 402 body, Bazaar declarations, price table
src/app.js          Hono app: gates, paywall, HTTP twins, free meta
src/mcp.js          MCP server + streamable-HTTP mount (proxies the HTTP twins)
src/mcp-stdio.js    stdio transport entry
src/node-server.js  Node entry: disk -> memory at boot
src/worker.js       Cloudflare Workers entry (KV-backed; no account created)
src/evm-keys.js     keygen/address, same pattern as cad-on-chain
scripts/            keygen, sdn-refresh, balance, demo, gen-manifests
registry/           server.json (MCP registry), bazaar-mcp.json
data/               sdn-addresses.json (vendored OFAC export)
test/               50 tests

Free MCP server on Cloudflare Workers (deployed 2026-08-27)

Live: https://cryptoport-mcp.cryptoport-port.workers.dev/mcp — MCP over HTTP, six tools, free, no key and no account.

Master ruled on 2026-08-27 that the free MCP server ships before the paid x402 port is hosted: it is the "free front door onto a human budget" from the strategy memo, it is the only thing that produces the visitor number the day-30 checkpoint needs, and the descriptor the site publishes at /.well-known/mcp.json had been naming tools with no server behind them.

Free by construction, not by policy. wrangler.jsonc sets no X402_PAY_TO, so createApp never mounts the x402 middleware, isCharging() reports price_usdc: "0" and paid: false on every response, and no tool description quotes a cost. Master's ruling 4a — paid tier declined until the day-60 checkpoint — is therefore enforced by the absence of a variable rather than by anyone remembering it. ⛔ Do not add X402_PAY_TO to this Worker. The paid port is a separate deployment whose hosting was deferred; turning payments on here would flip a declined tier by editing a config file.

Data path. scripts/kv-push.mjs reads the built dist/ and writes feed, coins, catalysts and sdn into the BOARD KV namespace. The Worker reads KV; it never touches a filesystem and never calls back to Bluehost — which also means machine clients that Bluehost's mod_security rejects (python-requests gets a 406 there) can reach the board here.

No zone, no DNS. It answers on the account's own *.workers.dev subdomain. No record on thecryptoport.com or any other portfolio domain was created or changed, which is what keeps this clear of the never-touch mail directive on those zones.

Daily refresh — INSTALLED 2026-08-27 on Master's sign-off

KV holds whatever was last pushed, so the push rides the end of the existing 07:50 chain — it runs only if the build, the allowlist gate and the deploy all succeeded.

Dry-run it under cron's environment before ever changing this line. wrangler's shebang is #!/usr/bin/env node, and cron's minimal PATH has no node: the first attempt died with exit 127, the same trap that killed the channel_intel pipeline on 2026-08-15. kv-push.mjs now extends PATH with its own process.execPath directory. The check that catches it:

env -i HOME=/home/ops PATH=/usr/bin:/bin SHELL=/bin/sh \
  /home/ops/.nvm/versions/node/v24.15.0/bin/node scripts/kv-push.mjs
# CURRENT (installed):
50 7 * * * /usr/bin/python3 generate.py >> /home/ops/.cache/cryptoport-site.log 2>&1 && /usr/bin/python3 test_allowlist.py --dir dist >> /home/ops/.cache/cryptoport-site.log 2>&1 && SSH_HOST=162.241.252.122 SSH_USER=rpbdbsmy REMOTE_DIR=/home4/rpbdbsmy/thecryptoport.com ./deploy.sh go >> /home/ops/.cache/cryptoport-site.log 2>&1

# PROPOSED — same line with the KV push appended (runs only if the gate passed):
50 7 * * * cd /home/ops/Documents/Claude/myPKA/infra/cryptoport-site && /usr/bin/python3 generate.py >> /home/ops/.cache/cryptoport-site.log 2>&1 && /usr/bin/python3 test_allowlist.py --dir dist >> /home/ops/.cache/cryptoport-site.log 2>&1 && SSH_HOST=162.241.252.122 SSH_USER=rpbdbsmy REMOTE_DIR=/home4/rpbdbsmy/thecryptoport.com ./deploy.sh go >> /home/ops/.cache/cryptoport-site.log 2>&1 && /home/ops/.nvm/versions/node/v24.15.0/bin/node /home/ops/projects/cryptoport-port/scripts/kv-push.mjs >> /home/ops/.cache/cryptoport-site.log 2>&1

Run it by hand any time: node scripts/kv-push.mjs.

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