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Patchlabs MCP Server

Developer ToolsUse Caution4.6MCP RegistryRemote
Free

Server data from the Official MCP Registry

Security checks for AI-built apps (Lovable, Supabase, Bolt): RLS, headers, monitoring, fixes.

About

Security checks for AI-built apps (Lovable, Supabase, Bolt): RLS, headers, monitoring, fixes.

Remote endpoints: streamable-http: https://api.patchlabs.dev/mcp

Security Report

4.6
Use Caution4.6High Risk

The remote MCP endpoint in api/mcp_server.py is well built: it checks Origin, requires JSON content type, caps body and batch size, and gates list_apps and run_check behind a workspace API key. The main concern is that headers_check fetches a user-supplied URL server-side, which creates a possible SSRF path into internal networks, and start_check can send email to arbitrary addresses without authentication. core.py and posture.py were not provided, so the API key check and the URL fetch restrictions could not be verified. Supply chain analysis found 5 known vulnerabilities in dependencies (0 critical, 4 high severity).

4 files analyzed · 10 issues found

Security scores are indicators to help you make informed decisions, not guarantees. Always review permissions before connecting any MCP server.

Permissions Found in Source Code

Found by scanning the linked source code. This listing connects to a hosted endpoint, so none of this runs on your machine: it describes what the server software does where it is hosted.

HTTP Network Access

Connects to external APIs or services over the internet.

database

Applies to the server that hosts this plugin, not to your machine.

env_vars

Applies to the server that hosts this plugin, not to your machine.

How to Connect

Remote Plugin

No local installation needed. Your AI client connects to the remote endpoint directly.

Add this to your MCP configuration to connect:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "dev-patchlabs-patchlabs": {
      "url": "https://api.patchlabs.dev/mcp"
    }
  }
}

Documentation

View on GitHub

From the project's GitHub README.

PatchLabs

Leak checks and tested fixes for AI-built apps: https://patchlabs.dev

PartWhereRuns on
docs/Website: landing page, check status and report page, privacyGitHub Pages (patchlabs.dev)
api/FastAPI: checks, accounts, workspaces, monitored apps, receipts, free RLS tool, MCP (see API below)Azure Container Apps (api.patchlabs.dev)
db/schema.sqlPostgres schema, idempotent and additive; applied by the API on startAzure Database for PostgreSQL, database patchlabs
worker/Takes verified checks, runs the lab pipeline (Docker + Claude Code), posts reports; deletes run folders older than 30 daysManraj's Mac, kept alive by launchd

Flow

  1. Visitor enters a GitHub repo and email on patchlabs.dev → POST /checks.
  2. They prove the repo is theirs by committing patchlabs-verify.txt with a one-time code → POST /checks/{id}/verify.
  3. The worker claims the check (POST /worker/claim), rebuilds the database from the repo's migrations in a lab, finds personal data the wrong people can read, has the fix agent write a fix (Haiku first, escalating to Sonnet then Opus only if the lab proof fails), and posts the report (POST /worker/checks/{id}/result).
  4. The check page shows the report, the proof table and the fix, and offers the fix as a download. An email goes out at each step once SMTP is configured.

API

Contract: SPEC.md. JSON everywhere; errors are {"detail": "..."}. Signed-in calls send Authorization: Bearer <session>, CI calls send X-API-Key: pl_live_..., worker and admin calls send their bearer tokens.

ModuleEndpoints
app.pyGET /health, POST /checks, GET /checks/{id}, POST /checks/{id}/verify, POST /worker/heartbeat|claim (claim also runs the scheduler), POST /worker/checks/{id}/result, GET /admin/checks
accounts.pyPOST /workspaces/{wid}/webhook/rotate-secret, POST /auth/start|finish|logout, POST /invites/accept, GET|PATCH|DELETE /me, GET /me/export, GET /me/checks, GET|PATCH /workspaces/{wid}, POST /workspaces/{wid}/webhook/test, POST /workspaces/{wid}/invites, DELETE /workspaces/{wid}/invites/{id}, PATCH|DELETE /workspaces/{wid}/members/{uid}, GET|POST /workspaces/{wid}/api-keys, DELETE /workspaces/{wid}/api-keys/{kid}, POST /workspaces/{wid}/upgrade-request, GET /admin/workspaces, PATCH /admin/workspaces/{wid}, GET /admin/upgrade-requests
monitor.pyGET|POST /workspaces/{wid}/apps, GET|PATCH|DELETE /apps/{aid}, POST /apps/{aid}/verify, POST /apps/{aid}/checks, GET /badge/{aid}.svg, GET /public/apps/{aid}, GET /stats, POST /v1/apps/{aid}/checks, GET /v1/checks/{cid}
receipts.pyPOST /checks/{id}/decision, POST /checks/{id}/answers, GET /checks/{id}/decisions (members), GET /receipts/{id}, GET /.well-known/patchlabs-receipt-key
rls.pyPOST /tools/rls-check
mcp_server.pyPOST /mcp (tools: rls_check, start_check, get_check, list_apps, run_check)

Env: DATABASE_URL, WORKER_TOKEN, ADMIN_TOKEN, SITE_URL, CORS_ORIGINS, SMTP_*, RECEIPT_PRIVATE_KEY (required: base64 of a 32-byte Ed25519 seed, python3 -c "import os,base64;print(base64.b64encode(os.urandom(32)).decode())"; the API refuses to start without it unless PATCHLABS_DEV=1), optional GITHUB_TOKEN, FOUNDER_EMAIL. Test hooks: EMAIL_OUTBOX, GITHUB_API, RAW_GITHUB. Security rules (rate limits, verification, masking): see "Security rules" in SPEC.md.

Webhooks are signed: X-PatchLabs-Signature: v1=<hex HMAC-SHA256 of "<timestamp>.<raw body>"> with the workspace's whsec_ secret and X-PatchLabs-Timestamp; verification snippet at https://patchlabs.dev/docs/webhooks#security.

Verify a receipt (signed bytes are the receipt as JSON with sorted keys and (",", ":") separators):

import base64, json, urllib.request
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PublicKey
API, CHECK = "https://api.patchlabs.dev", "<check id>"
r = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(f"{API}/receipts/{CHECK}"))
k = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(f"{API}/.well-known/patchlabs-receipt-key"))
assert r["key_id"] == k["key_id"], "signed with a different key"
msg = json.dumps(r["receipt"], sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
pub = Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(base64.b64decode(k["public_key"]))
pub.verify(base64.b64decode(r["signature"]), msg)  # raises InvalidSignature if anything was changed
print("receipt is genuine:", r["receipt"]["status"], r["receipt"]["tables_leaking"])

Tests: tools/test-api.sh runs the whole suite in Docker (throwaway postgres:17 + python:3.13-slim) and cleans up after itself; extra arguments go to pytest, e.g. tools/test-api.sh -k webhook -x.

Deploy the API

TAG=$(date +%Y%m%d%H%M)
az acr build -r sponsorjobsregistry -t patchlabs-api:$TAG -f api/Dockerfile .
az containerapp update -g ics-rg -n patchlabs-api --image sponsorjobsregistry.azurecr.io/patchlabs-api:$TAG

Before the first v2 deploy, set RECEIPT_PRIVATE_KEY as a secret on the container app: without it the new image won't start.

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