How do I install Evite?

Evite is a local plugin. Install it using npm package: evite-mcp and add the generated configuration snippet to your AI app's MCP config file. Then restart your AI app.

Is Evite safe to use?

Yes. Evite passed MCP Marketplace's automated security scan with a score of 9.3/10 (low risk). Every server on MCP Marketplace is security-scanned before it's listed; see the full security report on this page for the findings and permissions.

What credentials does Evite need?

Evite requires the following credentials or environment variables: EVITE_EMAIL, EVITE_PASSWORD, EVITE_SESSION_COOKIE, EVITE_SESSION_CACHE, EVITE_SESSION_FILE. You can find setup instructions on the server detail page.

What AI apps work with Evite?

Evite uses the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and works with any MCP-compatible AI app, including Claude, ChatGPT / Codex, Gemini, Copilot, Cursor, and more.

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Evite MCP Server

by Chris Hall

Developer ToolsLow Risk9.3Local

Free

Evite for Claude — list events, guest lists & RSVPs, RSVP, message guests, and create/edit events

About

Evite for Claude — list events, guest lists & RSVPs, RSVP, message guests, and create/edit events

Security Report

9.3

Low Risk9.3Low Risk

Valid MCP server (1 strong, 1 medium validity signals). 2 known CVEs in dependencies (0 critical, 1 high severity) Package registry verified. Imported from the Official MCP Registry. Trust signals: trusted author (75/76 approved); 3 highly-trusted packages.

3 files analyzed · 3 issues found

Security scores are indicators to help you make informed decisions, not guarantees. Always review permissions before connecting any MCP server.

Permissions Required

This plugin requests these system permissions. Most are normal for its category.

file_system

Check that this permission is expected for this type of plugin.

HTTP Network Access

Connects to external APIs or services over the internet.

What You'll Need

Set these up before or after installing:

Your Evite login email address. Optional — if omitted, the server falls back to a raw session cookie or the fetchproxy browser bridge (requires being signed in to evite.com).Optional

Environment variable: EVITE_EMAIL

Your Evite password. Optional — see EVITE_EMAIL.Required

Environment variable: EVITE_PASSWORD

A raw `cookie:` header copied from a signed-in evite.com tab (alternative to email/password). Used verbatim. Optional.Required

Environment variable: EVITE_SESSION_COOKIE

Set to false to disable the on-disk session cache and re-authenticate on every process start. Defaults to enabled.Optional

Environment variable: EVITE_SESSION_CACHE

Absolute path for the session cache file. Defaults to $MCP_DATA_DIR/.evite-mcp/session.json.Optional

Environment variable: EVITE_SESSION_FILE

How to Install

Add this to your MCP configuration file:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "io-github-chrischall-evite-mcp": {
      "env": {
        "EVITE_EMAIL": "your-evite-email-here",
        "EVITE_PASSWORD": "your-evite-password-here",
        "EVITE_SESSION_FILE": "your-evite-session-file-here",
        "EVITE_SESSION_CACHE": "your-evite-session-cache-here",
        "EVITE_SESSION_COOKIE": "your-evite-session-cookie-here"
      },
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "evite-mcp"
      ],
      "command": "npx"
    }
  }
}

Documentation

View on GitHub

From the project's GitHub README.

evite-mcp

A Model Context Protocol server for Evite — read and act on your events as both guest (invitations received) and host (events you created): list events, view guest lists & RSVP tallies, RSVP, message guests, and create/edit events. Built on @chrischall/mcp-utils.

Status: read + write tools live. The five read tools work against Evite's internal API, authenticating from email/password (tier-1, POST /ajax_login), a raw cookie env var, or a signed-in browser tab (fetchproxy bootstrap). The thirteen write tools are confirm-gated — without confirm: true they only return a dry-run preview and send nothing — and their endpoints are live-verified (see docs/EVITE-API.md); a couple of request bodies are still assumed rather than captured (#3).

Tools

Six read tools (all read-only), thirteen confirm-gated write tools, plus evite_healthcheck:

Tool	Endpoint	Returns
`evite_list_events`	`GET /services/events/v1/`	your events + a totals breakdown (`filterBy` = all/host/others, repeatable `status`, `offset`/`numResults` paging)
`evite_get_event`	`GET /services/event/v1/{id}`	single-event detail (event, settings, location)
`evite_list_guests`	`GET /services/event/v1/{id}/guests/`	the guest list + RSVP responses (delivery status, views, short links)
`evite_rsvp_summary`	(derived from guests)	just the RSVP summary (yes/no/maybe/noReply + head counts)
`evite_list_messages`	`GET /services/event/v1/{id}/posts/`	the event's Messages thread
`evite_list_templates`	scrapes `/invites/{category}/`	invitation template slugs (the `template_name` `evite_create_event` needs) + display names

Write tools (confirm-gated)

Every write tool takes confirm: boolean. Without confirm: true it performs no network call and returns a dry-run preview of exactly what would be sent — that is the safe default. Only confirm: true reaches the live path. Endpoints are verified; the CSRF token (X-CSRFToken, read fresh per request as it rotates) is attached centrally.

Tool	Endpoint	Action
`evite_rsvp`	`PUT /services/event/v1/{id}/guests/{guestId}`	RSVP for a guest (response + adult/kid head counts + optional note)
`evite_send_message`	`POST /tsunami/v1/services/event/{id}/guest/{gid}/messages`	send a private message to one guest (body assumed)
`evite_broadcast`	`POST /tsunami/v1/services/event/{id}/broadcast/`	broadcast a message to whole RSVP segments (`virtual_groups`) at once
`evite_upload_photo`	`POST …/photos/v1/{id}/upload/request/` → GCS → finish → shared-gallery	upload a local image to the event's shared photo album (4-step GCS signed upload)
`evite_create_event`	`POST /services/event/v1/` (`{event:{…}}`)	create an event draft (needs `template_name`; the API 500s even on success)
`evite_update_event`	`PATCH /services/event/v1/{id}` (`{event:{…}}`)	edit an event (only the fields you pass change)
`evite_add_guest`	`POST /ajax/event/{id}/guestlist/draft/`	add guests to the draft (un-sent) list — `[{name,email}]`
`evite_update_guest`	`PATCH /ajax/event/{id}/guestlist/draft/`	edit a draft guest's name/email/phone
`evite_remove_guest`	`DELETE /ajax/event/{id}/guestlist/draft/{gid}`	remove a draft guest
`evite_send`	`POST /services/event/v1/{id}/send/`	"Send now" — emails the ready-to-send guests
`evite_cancel_event`	`POST …/actions/cancel/`	cancel an event / delete a draft (destructive; reversible)
`evite_reinstate_event`	`POST …/actions/reinstate/`	reinstate a cancelled event
`evite_duplicate_event`	`GET /plus/create/{id}/copy/` (→302)	copy an event into a fresh draft; returns the new event id

The authoring flow is evite_create_event → evite_add_guest → evite_send. evite_send, evite_send_message, evite_broadcast, and evite_cancel_event have real-world effects (emails / cancellation notices), so their confirm-gating matters.

Architecture

Fetchproxy-archetype MCP. Evite has no public API, so the server calls Evite's internal /services/ web API using your session. src/auth.ts resolves that session in priority order:

EVITE_EMAIL + EVITE_PASSWORD (tier-1, preferred) — headless email/password form login: POST the creds to https://www.evite.com/ajax_login, then build the session from the response Set-Cookie jar (x-evite-session, evtsession, csrftoken, x-evite-features). No browser bridge, no hand-copied cookie. Both vars must be set, or the resolver falls through. (Live.)
EVITE_SESSION_COOKIE — a raw cookie: header copied from a signed-in evite.com tab (or set in CI). Used verbatim. (Live.)
Fetchproxy bootstrap (fallback) — lift the session cookies (x-evite-session, evtsession, x-evite-features, csrftoken) from a signed-in evite.com browser tab via @fetchproxy/bootstrap. Bootstrap runs once; every API call then goes out via plain Node fetch() with the cookies attached. Opt out with EVITE_DISABLE_FETCHPROXY=1. (Live.)

One tier is intentionally deferred (the resolver is shaped to slot it in):

Fetchproxy as transport (bot-wall retry through the browser bridge) — a fallback only needed if plain fetch trips a wall; not observed during discovery.

The thirteen write tools (rsvp, add/update/remove-guest, send, send-message, broadcast, upload-photo, create/update/cancel/reinstate/duplicate event) are confirm-gated (dry-run preview unless confirm: true). The single private client.write() helper attaches the CSRF token via one centralized header (CSRF_HEADER = X-CSRFToken; the csrftoken cookie rotates mid-session, so it's read fresh per request). Endpoints span three bases — REST /services/…, the legacy /ajax/event/{id}/… guest list, and the /tsunami/… messaging service — all live-verified; a couple of request bodies remain assumed (#3).

Development

npm install      # resolves @chrischall/mcp-utils from a local tarball (see issue #4)
npm run build
npm test

Docs & roadmap

Design spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-31-evite-mcp-design.md
Plan 1 (scaffold + spike): docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-31-evite-mcp-scaffold-and-spike.md
Plan 2 (auth + read tools): docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-31-evite-mcp-auth-and-reads.md
Internal API reference (verified from a live session): docs/EVITE-API.md

Open work: #3 — write endpoints + CSRF are now live-verified; only a couple of request bodies (send / send-message) remain assumed. #4 tracks publishing the shared lib. (Discovery #1, tier-1 email/password login #2, and the read tools are done.)