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Voyager's web-page sense: safe read-only observation of one live URL (structure, security, a11y).
About
Voyager's web-page sense: safe read-only observation of one live URL (structure, security, a11y).
Security Report
7.2
Moderate7.2Low RiskThis is a well-engineered MCP server that performs read-only web page observation with strong security controls. The code demonstrates excellent SSRF mitigation (DNS pinning, IP classification, redirect re-validation), careful input sanitization (injection stripping on all untrusted content), and honest capability reporting. Minor code quality issues around broad exception handling and overly permissive regex patterns are present but do not materially impact security. Supply chain analysis found 1 known vulnerability in dependencies (0 critical, 1 high severity). Package verification found 1 issue.
6 files analyzed · 9 issues found
Security scores are indicators to help you make informed decisions, not guarantees. Always review permissions before connecting any MCP server.
Permissions Required
This plugin requests these system permissions. Most are normal for its category.
How to Install
Add this to your MCP configuration file:
{
"mcpServers": {
"io-github-dir-ai-voyager-browser": {
"args": [
"-y",
"@dir-ai/voyager-browser"
],
"command": "npx"
}
}
}Documentation
View on GitHubFrom the project's GitHub README.
@dir-ai/voyager-browser
Voyager's web-page sense. A safe, read-only observation of one live URL: its structure, forms, links, script origins, security posture (HTTPS / HSTS / CSP / mixed-content / cookies) and accessibility signals (lang, image alt coverage, heading order) — each with a described, never applied fix.
It parses static HTML — no JavaScript execution, no headless browser — so
it's honest about what it can and cannot see (it will not render a client-side
SPA's runtime state). Every piece of page text is returned framed as
untrusted. It is SSRF-gated: it refuses non-http(s) URLs and anything
resolving to private, loopback, or cloud-metadata addresses.
One sense in the Voyager family. Read-only, like all the senses — it never submits a form, clicks, or mutates anything.
Install
npm i -g @dir-ai/voyager-browser
Use
voyager-browser observe https://example.com
voyager-browser observe https://example.com --json
https://example.com/
https://example.com — 200; 3 finding(s), worst: medium. 0 form(s), 1 link(s).
title: Example Domain
security: https · a11y lang:yes alt:n/a
med HTTPS without HSTS
↳ add Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains
med no Content-Security-Policy
↳ add a Content-Security-Policy to constrain scripts/resources
low no X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
↳ add X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
As an MCP server
One tool, observe_page.
{ "command": "voyager-browser", "args": ["mcp"] }
As a library
import { observe } from '@dir-ai/voyager-browser'
const brief = await observe('https://example.com')
console.log(brief.summary)
console.log(brief.security) // { https, hsts, csp, mixedContent, thirdPartyScripts, … }
console.log(brief.forms) // insecure / cross-origin / sensitive flags
console.log(brief.findings) // severity + described fix
What it looks for
- Security posture (quality, not just presence) — plain HTTP; missing/weak HSTS; missing CSP or a CSP graded weak (
unsafe-inline/unsafe-eval/wildcard/noobject-src/nobase-uri); missing clickjacking protection (X-Frame-Options /frame-ancestors); missingnosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy; version-leakingServer/X-Powered-By; mixed content on an HTTPS page (origin-compared, not prefix); per-cookie Secure/HttpOnly; third-party scripts without Subresource Integrity. - Forms — a form on HTTPS posting to plain HTTP (
critical); a sensitive form (password/payment) posting cross-origin or over HTTP; a sensitivePOSTwith no anti-CSRF token; sensitive data onGET. - Links — external
target="_blank"withoutrel="noopener"(reverse-tabnabbing). - Accessibility — missing
<html lang>, images withoutalt, skipped heading levels, unlabeled form fields. - Render honesty — a
render: static | hybrid | client-heavyfield: if a page's content is JavaScript-rendered, the brief says so and marks itself PARTIAL rather than reporting a shell as clean. - Composition hints — third-party script origins to vet with
@dir-ai/voyager/@dir-ai/voyager-net.
Safety
- Read-only. Fetches the page with a single GET; never submits, clicks, or mutates.
- No code execution. Static HTML parsing only — the page's JavaScript is never run.
- SSRF-gated, with IP pinning. Only
http(s); a single URL (no lists/credentials). The host is resolved, every address is classified canonically (IPv4-mapped IPv6, unspecified, CGNAT, NAT64, link-local, private, loopback, metadata all refused), and the connection is pinned to the vetted IP so DNS rebinding cannot swap in an internal address between the check and the fetch. Every redirect hop is re-vetted and re-pinned. - Untrusted by construction. Every owner-controlled string that reaches the brief — title, headings, meta, links, form actions, field names — is injection-stripped and framed; the agent must treat it as data, not instructions.
- Bounded. One deadline covers headers and body; the body is byte-capped; a truncated read downgrades confidence and is never reported as "clean".
- Honest limits. It reads what the server sends. It does not see client-rendered state — and the
renderfield says exactly how much it saw.
Roadmap
- v0.3 — same-origin JS-bundle static scan (exposed secrets/endpoints/source-maps), third-party/tracker/cookie inventory + tech fingerprinting, WCAG-mapped a11y depth, and a
CognitiveClaimadapter so a page observation drops into a@dir-ai/voyager-agentmission (page → host → dependency chain). - v1.0 — an opt-in, consent-gated
--rendersandboxed headless pass (network-isolated, resource-capped) for true SPA/rendered-DOM coverage, always labeled as render-mode output; a stable finding-kindtaxonomy and a full posture score.
The line stays fixed: voyager-browser expands by reading more of what's already served, never by doing more to the server. Anything active (submitting, fuzzing, probing) belongs to a separate consent-gated organ.
The Voyager family
| Package | Sense |
|---|---|
@dir-ai/voyager | web — verified-internet retrieval |
@dir-ai/voyager-browser | web page — observe one live URL |
@dir-ai/voyager-repo | code — orient in a repository |
@dir-ai/voyager-net | hosts — authorized host audit |
@dir-ai/voyager-contract | the cognitive contract the senses speak |
@dir-ai/voyager-agent | the one agent that composes them |
License
MIT © dir-ai
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