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Local credential broker: agents call APIs, SSH and DBs via scoped presets; secrets stay in keychain.
About
Local credential broker: agents call APIs, SSH and DBs via scoped presets; secrets stay in keychain.
Security Report
Valid MCP server (1 strong, 1 medium validity signals). No known CVEs in dependencies. Package registry verified. Imported from the Official MCP Registry.
14 files analyzed · 1 issue found
Security scores are indicators to help you make informed decisions, not guarantees. Always review permissions before connecting any MCP server.
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How to Install
Add this to your MCP configuration file:
{
"mcpServers": {
"io-github-ermoluk-mcp-warden": {
"args": [
"-y",
"@mcp-warden/cli"
],
"command": "npx"
}
}
}Documentation
View on GitHubFrom the project's GitHub README.
mcp-warden
A local-first credential broker for the Model Context Protocol — lets any AI coding agent (Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, Codex, Continue, Zed) take real actions without ever seeing your secrets.
The agent calls high-level tools (proxy_http); mcp-warden injects the secret server-side, executes the action, and returns only the result. Your context window stays clean. A leaked transcript leaks nothing useful.

How it works
- You store a credential once in the OS keychain via the
mcp-wardenCLI. - You define presets — named, scoped actions (e.g.
github-read,stripe-charges). - The AI agent connects to
mcp-wardenas an MCP server (stdio). - When the agent wants to act, it calls
proxy_httpwith a preset name and a path/method. mcp-wardenvalidates the request against the preset's allow-list, injects the credential, executes, and returns only the response.- Sensitive presets trigger an approval prompt: a native dialog on macOS and Windows, a desktop notification with Approve / Deny on Linux, or a Telegram message on any OS — where
/lockalso works as a kill switch from your phone. Opt in to time-boxed approvals per preset so one OK can cover a short burst of follow-up calls without re-prompt spam. - Every action lands in a local SQLite audit log, hash-chained and anchored in the keychain so an edit shows (
mcp-warden audit verify) — including awindoweddecision for calls authorised by an active approval window, arefuseddecision (with the raw requested path or command) for calls the allow-list turned away, and afaileddecision when the approval prompt could not be shown.
The agent's context window contains zero secrets.
Install
Every option installs the same single binary — no background service, no auto-updater, no telemetry. To update, run the same tool again.
macOS and Linux — Homebrew
brew install ermoluk/tap/mcp-warden
Windows — Scoop
scoop bucket add ermoluk https://github.com/ermoluk/scoop-bucket
scoop install ermoluk/mcp-warden
A winget package (ermoluk.mcp-warden) and an AUR package (mcp-warden-bin) are coming but not listed yet. Until they are, use Scoop on Windows, and Homebrew or the install script below on Arch Linux; on Linux the script installs the static musl build.
Nix (builds from source)
nix profile install github:ermoluk/mcp-warden
npm — for MCP clients configured with npx. The package is scoped: the unscoped mcp-warden on npm is an unrelated project.
{ "mcpServers": { "mcp-warden": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@mcp-warden/cli", "mcp"] } } }
The binary for your platform comes from an optional dependency; nothing is downloaded at install or run time. npx @mcp-warden/cli init and the other subcommands work the same way.
Rust — prebuilt with cargo-binstall, or from source (Rust 1.94.1+):
cargo binstall mcp-warden
cargo install --locked mcp-warden
Install script — downloads the release archive for your machine, refuses it unless it matches the release's SHA256SUMS, and puts the binary in ~/.local/bin (Windows: %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\mcp-warden\bin). No sudo, and it changes neither your PATH nor your shell profile. Read it first if you like: install.sh, install.ps1.
curl -fsSL https://github.com/ermoluk/mcp-warden/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
irm https://github.com/ermoluk/mcp-warden/releases/latest/download/install.ps1 | iex
Claude Desktop — download the .mcpb bundle for your platform from the latest release and open it. The bundle contains only the server; install the CLI with one of the options above to create presets and store secrets.
By hand — every GitHub release has archives for macOS (arm64, x86_64), Linux (x86_64, aarch64; static musl builds, plus an x86_64 glibc build) and Windows (x86_64), a combined SHA256SUMS, and a build-provenance attestation for each archive:
gh attestation verify mcp-warden-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz --repo ermoluk/mcp-warden
The macOS binaries are not notarized. Homebrew, npm, cargo and the install script don't mark them as downloaded, but an archive or bundle saved from a browser may be blocked by Gatekeeper until you run xattr -d com.apple.quarantine on it.
There is no Docker image, on purpose: the OS keychain — macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager, the Linux kernel keyring — isn't reachable from inside a container, and mcp-warden never falls back to keeping secrets in a file.
90-second quickstart
mcp-warden init
mcp-warden secret add gh_pat # paste your GitHub PAT when prompted
mcp-warden preset add github-read \
--type http \
--base-url https://api.github.com \
--auth-bearer gh_pat \
--allowed-methods GET \
--allowed-paths /user/repos \
--approval auto --confirm-auto
The preset auto-approves only GET /user/repos; any other path is refused before the token is touched. To let the agent read more, widen the allow-list (e.g. --allowed-paths '/user/repos,/repos/OWNER/[^/]+') and prefer a fine-grained PAT limited to specific repos. Patterns match the whole path, as exact strings or regexes anchored as ^(?:…)$, never as prefixes; [^/]+ is safer than .* for one segment. They see the percent-decoded path, so %2F is a separator: a GitLab-style id like /projects/group%2Fproject needs /projects/[^/]+/[^/]+. An HTTP preset with no allowed_paths allows every path under base_url — preset add and doctor warn about it, and the built-in github-read / gitea-read / stripe-read templates ship with approval = "prompt" for that reason.
Wire mcp-warden into your agent — see docs/claude-code-setup.md or docs/cursor-setup.md.
In your agent: ask "list my GitHub repos via mcp-warden". Watch the agent call list_presets, then proxy_http — and watch your PAT stay out of the prompt.
mcp-warden audit --last 5 # see what the agent did
Find and fix plaintext keys
Keys pasted into MCP client configs sit on disk in plaintext, where the agent, a synced dotfile or a screenshot can pick them up. Three commands fix that:
mcp-warden scan # where are plaintext keys? (shows type + length, never values)
mcp-warden import # move them into the keychain and rewire the client entries
mcp-warden run github # what the rewired entry runs: the server, with its key injected
scan reads Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code and Codex configs plus .mcp.json / .env files in the current directory (--path DIR for more). import handles keys in a stdio server's env; for keys in arguments, headers, URLs or .env files, scan says what to do instead. To wrap a server by hand: mcp-warden server add github --env GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-github (the value is read from stdin). Details: docs/scan-and-import.md.
CLI reference
| Command | Description |
|---|---|
mcp-warden init | Create the config directory and a template config |
mcp-warden secret add <name> | Store a secret (value read from stdin, never argv) |
mcp-warden secret list | List secret names (never values) |
mcp-warden secret remove <name> | Delete a secret from the keychain |
mcp-warden preset add <name> ... | Define a preset (--confirm-auto required for auto, then an approval prompt confirms it) |
mcp-warden preset confirm [name]... | Confirm auto presets through the approval prompt; an edited auto preset asks until confirmed again |
mcp-warden preset list | Show all presets |
mcp-warden preset test <name> | Validate a preset against the current keychain |
mcp-warden preset test <name> GET /path | Policy simulator: would this call be allowed, and why? Sends nothing (--command, --get/--put, --query for other tools) |
mcp-warden preset grant <name> --for 1h | Time-limited access: calls are refused after the window (--permanent clears it) |
mcp-warden preset revoke <name> | End access to a preset now (next server start; lock for immediately) |
mcp-warden lock [--reason …] | Kill switch: every MCP server refuses every call from its next one on (or send /lock to the Telegram bot) |
mcp-warden approval telegram-test | Check the Telegram setup: token, chat, a test prompt you answer |
mcp-warden unlock | Remove the lock after a human approves it in the dialog / Telegram |
mcp-warden scan | Find plaintext keys in MCP client configs and .env files (never prints values) |
mcp-warden import | Move the keys scan found into the keychain and point the client at mcp-warden run |
mcp-warden server add <name> --env VAR -- <cmd…> | Wrap another MCP server; its key is read from stdin into the keychain |
mcp-warden run <name> | Launch a wrapped MCP server with its keys injected (use as the client's command) |
mcp-warden preset scaffold <template> (v0.3.0) | Generate a preset from a built-in template (--list to discover) |
mcp-warden preset from-openapi <src> (v0.3.0) | Bootstrap a preset from an OpenAPI 3.x spec (URL or file) |
mcp-warden approval <preset> <policy> [--window N] | Set approval policy; --window N (sec) enables time-boxed approvals for prompt |
mcp-warden audit [--last N | --since T] [--decision D]… | Read-only view of the audit log (append-only by design), with what the agent asked for — including refused calls — and which MCP client and session made each call. --decision refused --decision failed shows only those decisions; --window N shows approval #N and every call that ran inside the window it opened |
mcp-warden audit verify [--format json] | Check the audit log's hash chain and every event against it, and the log against its anchor in the keychain; names what was changed, deleted, cut short or rewritten. Exit code 1 if anything does not hold |
mcp-warden doctor [--deep] (v0.3.0 for --deep) | Diagnostic summary; --deep runs safe read-only HTTP probes per preset |
mcp-warden web [--port N] (v0.3.0) | Local read-only web UI (binds 127.0.0.1 only) |
mcp-warden mcp | Run the MCP server over stdio (consumed by the AI agent) |
MCP tools exposed
list_presets— read-only catalogue of available actions.proxy_http— execute an HTTP request through a preset; allow-list validation runs before credential injection.ssh_exec(v0.2.0) — run a shell command on an SSH host; command must match preset's anchored regex allow-list; key-based auth + host-key verification.ssh_run(v0.6.0) — run one of an SSH preset's named commands: the command line is fixed in the preset, the agent supplies typed values (int, enum, string or path), checked before any credential is read. Optionally each command is also its own tool (expose_as_tools).sftp_transfer(v0.2.0) — get/put a file over SFTP; remote path matches preset'ssftp_allowed_paths, local path under$HOMEor/tmp.db_query(v0.2.0) — run a NAMED QUERY against PostgreSQL / MySQL / Redis. SQL/command is fixed at preset definition; agent supplies onlyquery_name+ positional params.get_secret_for_env— last-resort tool when a child process must read a secret fromenv. Always prompts for approval, regardless of preset policy.
Claude Code plugin
For Claude Code there is a plugin that bundles the MCP server config, a skill that teaches Claude to use mcp-warden correctly (discover presets first, never ask for tokens, respect approvals, treat get_secret_for_env as a last resort) and a guided /mcp-warden:setup command. Install the binary first, then in Claude Code:
/plugin marketplace add ermoluk/mcp-warden
/plugin install mcp-warden@mcp-warden
Restart Claude Code and run /mcp-warden:setup. If you previously added the server with claude mcp add, remove that entry so it isn't registered twice. Details: plugins/mcp-warden/.
Other MCP clients: see docs/claude-code-setup.md and docs/cursor-setup.md for manual setup.
What's new in v0.6.0
- Named SSH commands. Declare the commands an agent may run, with typed parameters (
int,enum,string,path); the agent callsssh_runwith a name and values, and never composes a command line. Every template is checked at startup, every value before the key is read, and the prompt shows the full command. Each command can have its own approval policy and window, andexpose_as_toolsmakes each one its own MCP tool. Try one withmcp-warden preset test NAME --run CMD --param k=v; start frommcp-warden preset scaffold ssh-deploy. - More ways to authenticate HTTP: an API key as a query parameter, OAuth2 (a fresh access token for each call, refresh-token rotation handled across processes) and AWS SigV4, with templates for Google Maps, Google Drive and S3.
- A tamper-evident audit log. Every write is hash-chained, the chain is anchored in the keychain, and
mcp-warden audit verifynames any edited, deleted or rolled-back entry. A rewritten log is never anchored. - Dependencies: russh 0.65, mysql_async 0.37 and notify-rust 4.18 clear seven of the eight accepted RustSec advisories; RSA SSH keys now sign with SHA-2, so they work with current OpenSSH.
- Plus:
max_output_bytesfor SSH presets,doctorwarnings for catch-all command patterns and destructive templates,scanrecognises AWS temporary keys and Google OAuth credentials, and upstream errors no longer include the request URL.
After upgrading:
- Restart your MCP clients, so no 0.5.x server keeps writing to the audit log without the chain.
- If you give a named command
approval = "auto", runmcp-warden preset confirmfor its preset; until then it asks. - Building from source now needs Rust 1.94.1. Prebuilt binaries and packages are unaffected.
Every change: CHANGELOG.md. The re-audit of this release is in docs/security/security-audit-2026-11.md.
How it compares
Other MCP credential brokers make different trade-offs:
| mcp-warden | Keyward | Wundervault | Janee | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Secret stays out of the agent's context | Yes, except get_secret_for_env, which always asks first | Not returned to the agent; written into a project file such as .env | Yes, no tool returns a value | Yes |
| What the agent can do | HTTP (bearer, header, basic, query key, OAuth2, AWS SigV4), named SSH commands with typed parameters, SSH commands, SFTP, named SQL / Redis queries | Have a key written into a project file | HTTP (incl. OAuth 1.0a signing), SSH commands / rsync, x402 payments, signing | HTTP (incl. AWS SigV4 / OAuth 1.0a signing), CLI tools with injected env vars |
| Per-call allow-lists | HTTP method + path, SSH named commands (typed values) or command regex, SFTP paths, named DB queries | Not yet (per-key policy is on its roadmap) | Allowed SSH hosts per key (any command on them); an approval is bound to the HTTP destination, method and path | HTTP method + path rules, allowed executables |
| Human approval | Native dialog (macOS, Windows), notification (Linux) or Telegram; on by default | Native OS dialog per request, once or for the session | Passkey, for secrets marked "ask me first" | ? |
| Where secrets live | OS keychain | age-encrypted file, master key in the OS keystore | End-to-end encrypted hosted vault, used by a local broker | Encrypted file in ~/.janee/, master key in the OS keychain or a file |
| No cloud account or background service | Yes | Yes | No: needs a wundervault.com vault and a broker installed with admin rights | Yes (stdio; HTTP mode for containers) |
| Audit log | Local SQLite, append-only, includes refused calls; hash-chained with a keychain anchor (audit verify) | Local JSONL of decisions | On your computer, signed, checked against a copy of the chain on their server | Local JSONL of requests |
| Kill switch | mcp-warden lock, or /lock in Telegram | ? | Revoke an agent in the vault | Revoke a session (janee revoke) |
| Works with any MCP client | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| License | Apache-2.0 | MIT | AGPL-3.0 (the hosted vault is not open source) | MIT |
| Install | Homebrew, Scoop, Nix, npm, cargo install / binstall, binaries for macOS / Linux / Windows | Homebrew, Scoop, go install, binaries | npm plus a broker installer, free account | npm or Docker |
Compared with Keyward 0.1.1, Wundervault MCP server 2.1.0 and Janee 0.16.0, from each project's README and docs as of November 2026. ? means not documented there. If something here is wrong or out of date, please open an issue.
Security model
mcp-warden's threat model and security invariants live in docs/threat-model.md. At a glance:
- Secrets in the OS keychain only — never on disk in plaintext, never in logs.
- A credential the upstream echoes back in a
proxy_httpresponse (an echo endpoint, an error that quotes the token) is replaced with[redacted by mcp-warden]before the agent sees it. The rest of the response is untrusted upstream data and is passed through as is. - Allow-list validation runs before credential injection.
- Default approval policy is
prompt;autorequires--confirm-autoat preset creation and a human confirmation in the approval prompt, bound to the preset's exact form — an editedautopreset asks again untilmcp-warden preset confirm. - The MCP server loads and validates
config.tomlonce at startup and never re-reads it: restart the server after editing presets. - Audit log is append-only — the trait surface itself contains no
delete/clearmethod. mcp-warden lockstops every running server at its next call; a server that has seen the lock stays locked until it restarts, andunlockneeds a human to approve it.- Presets can cap and trim what
proxy_httphands the agent (max_response_bytes,response_fields); a credential the upstream echoes back is always scrubbed. ssh_execrefuses shell syntax whatever the preset's patterns allow, because sshd runs every command through the remote login shell. For a second allow-list on the server — a dedicated account,command=/ForceCommandand a gate script — seedocs/ssh-hardening.md.- Wrapped servers (
mcp-warden run) only get keys stored for them (server/<name>/<VAR>), never a preset's secret, and their command is fixed in the config. The key is still visible to the process it is handed to. - Stdout is the MCP protocol channel; all logs go to stderr.
Links
- crates.io:
mcp-warden - Release notes: CHANGELOG.md
- MCP Registry name:
mcp-name: io.github.ermoluk/mcp-warden
License
Apache-2.0 — permanent commitment for the OSS core. See LICENSE.
mcp-warden stays fully functional for free, forever — see our open-core commitment.
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