Server data from the Official MCP Registry
Safety checks an agent runs before it acts: package malware, destructive command, secret leak.
Safety checks an agent runs before it acts: package malware, destructive command, secret leak.
Valid MCP server (1 strong, 4 medium validity signals). 2 code issues detected. No known CVEs in dependencies. Package registry verified. Imported from the Official MCP Registry.
7 files analyzed · 3 issues found
Security scores are indicators to help you make informed decisions, not guarantees. Always review permissions before connecting any MCP server.
This plugin requests these system permissions. Most are normal for its category.
Add this to your MCP configuration file:
{
"mcpServers": {
"io-github-ipezygj-agent-guard": {
"args": [
"agent-tripwire"
],
"command": "uvx"
}
}
}From the project's GitHub README.
The safety check an AI agent runs before it acts.
Every agent that installs packages, runs shell commands, or commits/outputs text can do real
damage: install malware, wipe a disk, or leak a credential. agent-guard is three cheap,
dependency-free checks — the "look before you leap" gate an agent (or you) calls before the
irreversible step.
pip install agent-tripwire # the checks (zero deps)
pip install "agent-tripwire[mcp]" # + the MCP server for agents
An agent can call these itself before acting. Add to your MCP client (Claude/Cursor/Claude Code):
{ "mcpServers": { "agent-guard": { "command": "agent-guard-mcp" } } }
MCP registry identity — mcp-name: io.github.ipezygj/agent-guard
| tool | the agent calls it before… |
|---|---|
check_package | pip/npm install — is it real, malware, a typosquat, or does it run code on install? |
check_command | running a shell command — is it a destructive / remote-code-exec vector (rm -rf, curl|bash, dd, force-push)? |
scan_secrets | committing / pasting / logging — does the text leak an API key, token, or private key? |
check_package — existence on the registry (a hallucinated name is a red flag), typosquat distance to popular packages, npm install/postinstall scripts (the classic supply-chain malware vector), and OSV malware/vulnerability advisories. Mainstream packages pass; look-alikes and install-time-code flag.
check_command — matches destructive / RCE shell patterns with a severity and a plain reason.
rm -rf /, curl … | bash, dd of=/dev/sda, fork bombs → critical; force-push, hard-reset,
sudo, DROP TABLE → high.
scan_secrets — AWS/OpenAI/Anthropic/Google/Stripe/GitHub/Slack keys, private-key blocks, JWTs,
and generic api_key=/password= assignments. Returns each finding (type, line, redacted).
from agent_guard import analyze_command, scan_secrets, check_package
analyze_command("rm -rf /")["danger"] # "critical"
scan_secrets("token = 'ghp_...'")["leaked"] # True
check_package("reqwests", "pypi")["risk"] # "high" (typosquat of requests)
The point: an agent about to install/run/commit should check first — and now it can, in one call, with a plain verdict and a recommendation. If a check comes back high/critical, stop and get a human.
MIT
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