Server data from the Official MCP Registry
Safety-first X (Twitter) API v2 MCP server: 41 typed tools across 12 packages, policy-gated.
About
Safety-first X (Twitter) API v2 MCP server: 41 typed tools across 12 packages, policy-gated.
Security Report
This is a well-engineered MCP server with strong security practices, comprehensive policy controls, and careful credential handling. The codebase demonstrates security-first defaults (host-scoped auth, token file hardening, untrusted content marking, cost immutability) and proper input validation. Minor findings around error handling and logging do not materially impact security posture. Permissions align well with the server's purpose of accessing the X API v2. Supply chain analysis found 8 known vulnerabilities in dependencies (0 critical, 4 high severity). Package verification found 1 issue.
3 files analyzed · 12 issues found
Security scores are indicators to help you make informed decisions, not guarantees. Always review permissions before connecting any MCP server.
Permissions Required
This plugin requests these system permissions. Most are normal for its category.
What You'll Need
Set these up before or after installing:
Environment variable: X_MCP_AUTH_MODE
Environment variable: X_MCP_CLIENT_ID
Environment variable: X_MCP_CLIENT_SECRET
Environment variable: X_MCP_BEARER_TOKEN
Environment variable: X_MCP_TOKEN_FILE
Environment variable: X_MCP_TOKEN_KEYCHAIN
Environment variable: X_MCP_POLICY
Environment variable: X_MCP_POLICY_ALLOW
Environment variable: X_MCP_POLICY_DENY
Environment variable: X_MCP_HIDE_DENIED
Environment variable: X_MCP_MEDIA_DIR
Environment variable: X_MCP_AVAILABILITY
Environment variable: X_MCP_PROFILES_FILE
Environment variable: X_MCP_PROFILE
Environment variable: X_MCP_TIMEOUT_MS
Environment variable: X_MCP_LOG_LEVEL
Environment variable: X_MCP_CREDIT_BUDGET
Environment variable: X_MCP_BUDGET_MODE
How to Install
Add this to your MCP configuration file:
{
"mcpServers": {
"io-github-ivanbbaev-x-mcp-ai": {
"env": {
"X_MCP_POLICY": "your-x-mcp-policy-here",
"X_MCP_PROFILE": "your-x-mcp-profile-here",
"X_MCP_AUTH_MODE": "your-x-mcp-auth-mode-here",
"X_MCP_CLIENT_ID": "your-x-mcp-client-id-here",
"X_MCP_LOG_LEVEL": "your-x-mcp-log-level-here",
"X_MCP_MEDIA_DIR": "your-x-mcp-media-dir-here",
"X_MCP_TIMEOUT_MS": "your-x-mcp-timeout-ms-here",
"X_MCP_TOKEN_FILE": "your-x-mcp-token-file-here",
"X_MCP_BUDGET_MODE": "your-x-mcp-budget-mode-here",
"X_MCP_HIDE_DENIED": "your-x-mcp-hide-denied-here",
"X_MCP_POLICY_DENY": "your-x-mcp-policy-deny-here",
"X_MCP_AVAILABILITY": "your-x-mcp-availability-here",
"X_MCP_BEARER_TOKEN": "your-x-mcp-bearer-token-here",
"X_MCP_POLICY_ALLOW": "your-x-mcp-policy-allow-here",
"X_MCP_CLIENT_SECRET": "your-x-mcp-client-secret-here",
"X_MCP_CREDIT_BUDGET": "your-x-mcp-credit-budget-here",
"X_MCP_PROFILES_FILE": "your-x-mcp-profiles-file-here",
"X_MCP_TOKEN_KEYCHAIN": "your-x-mcp-token-keychain-here"
},
"args": [
"-y",
"x-mcp-ai"
],
"command": "npx"
}
}
}Documentation
View on GitHubFrom the project's GitHub README.
x-mcp-ai — X (Twitter) MCP Server
An MCP server that exposes the X (Twitter) API v2 to MCP clients — Claude Code, Claude Desktop, VS Code, Cursor, or any MCP-compatible agent — as a curated set of typed tools, gated by a two-axis policy model and aware of the 2026 pay-per-use pricing so an agent can never quietly overspend.
Status: pre-1.0, under active development, published on npm as
x-mcp-ai(currently0.8.0, published from CI with npm provenance). Pin an exact version while the project is on0.x(Setup). 41 tools across 12 packages are registered today; the full designed surface lives indocs/03-tool-catalog.mdand is landing package by package. The public API is unstable until1.0.0.
Contents: Quick demo · Features · Requirements · Setup · Configure credentials · Cost · Run / debug · Develop · Tools · Resources · Prompts · Project structure · Security notes · Data handling · Documentation · Support · Trademark
Quick demo
Once the server is wired into your MCP client, you drive it in natural language and the model picks the tool. Three representative asks:
// 1. Read (default read-only preset — no writes possible)
// "What are people saying about the Model Context Protocol this week?"
{
"tool": "x_search_recent",
"arguments": { "query": "\"model context protocol\" -is:retweet lang:en", "max_results": 25 }
}
// 2. Engage (requires the `engage` preset or an explicit write:engagement allow)
// "Like that launch post for me."
{
"tool": "x_like_set",
"arguments": { "post_id": "1899…", "action": "like" }
}
// 3. Publish (requires the `publish` preset or write:content)
// "Post: 'Shipping x-mcp-ai today.' — mind the cost."
// Every result carries cost_usd + session_total_usd; a URL in the text raises the price 13×.
{
"tool": "x_post_create",
"arguments": { "text": "Shipping x-mcp-ai today." }
}
Features
- 41 tools across 12 packages over the X API v2 — read posts, users and timelines, search (recent and full-archive), engage, publish, manage lists, upload media, walk the social graph, and read/send DMs behind an explicit opt-in.
- Two-axis policy model (
operation:domain) with five presets —read-only(default),engage,publish,manage,full. Writes are opt-in; deny beats allow beats preset, per cell. Direct-message cells are double-locked:read:dm/write:dmare in no preset, not evenfull. - Cost awareness built in. Since 2026-02-06 the X API v2 is pay-per-use. Every result
reports its own
cost_usdand the runningsession_total_usd; an operator-setX_MCP_CREDIT_BUDGETwithX_MCP_BUDGET_MODE=hardrefuses calls that would exceed it, and the model cannot raise the cap. - Two auth modes — OAuth 2.0 PKCE user context (primary, rotating refresh tokens, single-flight refresh) and app-only bearer for read-only deployments.
- Security-first defaults — host-scoped
Authorizationheader, redirects never followed on token-bearing requests,0600token file written withO_NOFOLLOW/O_EXCL, untrusted-content marking on returned text, and media upload default-deny outside a realpath-containedX_MCP_MEDIA_DIR. - Typed failures. Eleven error classes, each carrying
retryableandfix: "agent" | "operator", so the model retries what is retryable and escalates what is not. - Structured output. Every tool advertises a JSON-Schema
outputSchemaand returnsstructuredContentalongside the text block. - Availability class-gating, live per-endpoint rate-limit tracking (including the 24-hour app cap on post creation), cursor pagination, and compact result rendering.
Requirements
- Node.js >= 22 (see
.nvmrc). - An X developer account and app with an OAuth 2.0 client (Client ID; Client Secret only for confidential clients). App-only mode needs a bearer token instead.
- Prepaid X API credits — the API bills per read and per write (see Cost).
Setup
The recommended install is the published package, pinned to an exact version while the
project is on 0.x — nothing to clone or build:
npx -y x-mcp-ai@0.8.0 doctor # sanity check; makes no billable calls
Then point your MCP client at it:
// claude_desktop_config.json (Claude Desktop) / .mcp.json (Claude Code) / .cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"x": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "x-mcp-ai@0.8.0"],
"env": {
"X_MCP_AUTH_MODE": "oauth2",
"X_MCP_CLIENT_ID": "your-oauth2-client-id",
"X_MCP_POLICY": "read-only",
"X_MCP_CREDIT_BUDGET": "5.00",
"X_MCP_BUDGET_MODE": "hard"
}
}
}
}
Running from a local checkout instead? Use "command": "node" with
"args": ["/abs/path/to/x-mcp/build/src/index.js"] and the same env map.
Claude Code from the CLI:
claude mcp add x --env X_MCP_POLICY=read-only -- npx -y x-mcp-ai@0.8.0
Per-client instructions — Claude Desktop, Claude Code, VS Code (.vscode/mcp.json),
Cursor and MCP Inspector — are in
docs/10-operator-guide.md §4, together with the authorize
flow and ready-made env recipes.
From source (development)
Still fully supported — build the entry point and spawn it with node instead of npx:
git clone https://github.com/IvanBBaev/x-mcp.git
cd x-mcp
npm ci
npm run build # tsc → build/src/index.js
node build/src/index.js doctor # sanity check; makes no billable calls
Configure credentials
The server never prompts interactively; all configuration comes from environment variables
(canonical table: docs/02-architecture.md §4; a starting point:
.env.example).
Auth modes (X_MCP_AUTH_MODE):
oauth2(default) — OAuth 2.0 with PKCE. Run the one-time authorization flow with theauthorizesubcommand; tokens land inX_MCP_TOKEN_FILEand are refreshed automatically.app-only— application-only bearer token (X_MCP_BEARER_TOKEN); read endpoints only, no user context.
X_MCP_AUTH_MODE=oauth2 X_MCP_CLIENT_ID=… node build/src/index.js authorize
Environment variables
| Variable | Default | Secret | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
X_MCP_AUTH_MODE | oauth2 | oauth2 | app-only. | |
X_MCP_CLIENT_ID | OAuth 2.0 client ID (required for authorize and refresh). | ||
X_MCP_CLIENT_SECRET | ✅ | OAuth 2.0 client secret (confidential clients only). | |
X_MCP_BEARER_TOKEN | ✅ | App-only bearer token; valid only with app-only. | |
X_MCP_TOKEN_FILE | OS-resolved | Path to the rotating OAuth 2.0 token store (~ expanded). | |
X_MCP_TOKEN_KEYCHAIN | 0 | 1 → store tokens in the OS keychain (macOS security, Linux secret-tool). Mutually exclusive with X_MCP_TOKEN_FILE. | |
X_MCP_POLICY | read-only | Preset: read-only | engage | publish | manage | full. | |
X_MCP_POLICY_ALLOW | Comma-separated operation:domain cells to add. | ||
X_MCP_POLICY_DENY | Comma-separated cells to remove (wins over allow and preset). | ||
X_MCP_HIDE_DENIED | 0 | 1 → drop denied tools from registration entirely. | |
X_MCP_CREDIT_BUDGET | Session spend cap, USD (e.g. 5.00). Unset = no cap. | ||
X_MCP_BUDGET_MODE | warn | warn | hard. | |
X_MCP_AVAILABILITY | Comma-separated availability classes to enable (pilot, premium-user, enterprise). | ||
X_MCP_MEDIA_DIR | Directory uploads must realpath inside (media default-deny). | ||
X_MCP_PROFILES_FILE | Multi-account profiles file. | ||
X_MCP_PROFILE | Active profile name (required with a profiles file). | ||
X_MCP_BASE_URL | https://api.x.com | API base URL; must be https:// and *.x.com. | |
X_MCP_ALLOW_INSECURE_BASE_URL | 0 | 1 → permit a non-x.com base URL (testing only). | |
X_MCP_TIMEOUT_MS | 30000 | Per-request timeout, milliseconds. | |
X_MCP_LOG_LEVEL | info | silent | error | info | debug. |
Any other X_MCP_* variable is ignored with a startup warning — that is the typo detector.
Every fatal configuration error names the variable at fault.
Two-axis access policy
Every tool maps to one policy cell — an operation:domain pair. Operations escalate
read → write → destructive; domains are content, user, account, engagement,
social-graph, moderation, dm. A preset unlocks a set of the 12 valid cells;
X_MCP_POLICY_ALLOW adds cells, X_MCP_POLICY_DENY removes them, and
deny > allow > preset.
| Preset | Grants | Callable tools |
|---|---|---|
read-only (default) | all read:* cells except read:dm | 21 |
engage | read-only + write:engagement | 26 |
publish | engage + write:content, write:moderation | 32 |
manage | publish + destructive:content | 34 |
full | every non-DM cell — adds write:social-graph, destructive:social-graph | 37 |
DM cells are never in a preset — not even
full.read:dmandwrite:dmmust be granted explicitly viaX_MCP_POLICY_ALLOW(all 41 tools callable). Their unlock hint is deliberately withheld from policy errors, as it is for every other sensitive cell. Denied tools stay registered but annotated(disabled by policy <preset>)unlessX_MCP_HIDE_DENIED=1.
Note that manage grants destructive content operations only — follow/mute/block need
full or an explicit write:social-graph / destructive:social-graph allow.
Cost
Pay-per-use is the only pricing model. X retired the Free/Basic/Pro subscription tiers for new developers on 2026-02-06; every read and write draws down prepaid credits. Since 2026-04-16, a post whose text contains a URL costs $0.20 instead of $0.015 — 13×. Set
X_MCP_CREDIT_BUDGETbefore pointing an agent at a real account.
Indicative rates (verified 2026-07-22): post reads ~$0.005 each, user lookups and
follower/following reads ~$0.010, own-data reads ~$0.001, DM events ~$0.010, post create
$0.015 (or $0.20 with a URL), DM send $0.015, list create $0.010, engagement writes
currently $0. X also caps post reads at 2,000,000 per month. The authoritative table is
docs/01-api-landscape.md §3; the operator's view is
docs/10-operator-guide.md §5.
The budget is per process, advisory, resets on restart, and is model-immutable — there is no per-call override and no tool that raises it.
Run / debug
MCP clients spawn the server for you. To run it by hand:
X_MCP_POLICY=read-only node build/src/index.js serve
Command-line interface
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
serve (default) | Start the MCP server over stdio. Running with no subcommand also serves. |
authorize [--manual] [--port <port>] | Run the one-time OAuth 2.0 PKCE authorization flow and persist the token file. |
doctor [--connect] | Print resolved config, path/permission checks and the policy matrix; no billable calls. --connect adds one unauthenticated reachability GET. |
stdout carries JSON-RPC only; diagnostics, warnings and the single
x-mcp-ai: fatal: <reason> startup line go to stderr. Symptom-driven fixes are in
docs/11-troubleshooting.md.
Develop
git clone https://github.com/IvanBBaev/x-mcp.git
cd x-mcp
npm ci
npm run build # tsc → build/
npm run check # typecheck + lint + format:check + test
Other scripts: npm run typecheck, npm run lint, npm run format / format:check,
npm test, npm run coverage (c8), and npm run verify (clean build + coverage + lint +
format check). See CONTRIBUTING.md for conventions and the full quality
gate.
Tools
The 41 tools registered today. "Read-only" marks tools in a read:* policy cell — those
callable under the default preset (DM reads excepted: they need an explicit allow).
"User" marks user-only tools, which require OAuth 2.0 user context and are unreachable
with an app-only bearer token. The designed surface, including tools not yet implemented,
is docs/03-tool-catalog.md; the full per-tool reference —
schemas, scopes, cost class, availability — is
docs/reference/tools.md.
The table below is generated from the tool registry by
npm run docs:gen. Do not edit it by hand:npm run checkregenerates and diffs it, so an edit fails CI rather than shipping. Same fordocs/reference/tools.md.
| Package | Tool | Cell | Read-only | User | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| auth | x_auth_status | read:account | ✅ | Report the active auth mode, the authenticated user (in user mode), granted OAuth scopes, the credential backend, detected availability, and the resolved policy matrix. | |
| auth | x_rate_limit_status | read:account | ✅ | Dump the in-process rate-limit table — per bucket (endpoint-class × auth-context), each tracked window's limit, remaining, reset time, and whether it is currently exhausted. | |
| posts | x_post_get | read:content | ✅ | Batch-fetch one or more X (Twitter) posts by numeric id or status URL (1-100 per call). | |
| posts | x_post_create | write:content | ✅ | Create a post — text, optional reply_to_id, quote_id, media_ids[], poll {options[], duration_minutes}, reply_settings. | |
| posts | x_post_delete | destructive:content | ✅ | Delete own post by id. | |
| posts | x_post_hide_reply | write:moderation | ✅ | Hide or unhide a reply to one of your own posts. | |
| users | x_user_get | read:user | ✅ | Batch fetch of X (Twitter) user profiles by numeric id, @handle, bare handle, or the sentinel me (the authenticated user). | |
| search | x_search_recent | read:content | ✅ | Search X (Twitter) posts from the last 7 days using the full v2 query syntax (from:, to:, conversation_id:, boolean operators). | |
| search | x_post_counts_recent | read:content | ✅ | Return a volume histogram (post counts per time bucket) for an X (Twitter) v2 query over the last 7 days, at minute/hour/day granularity. | |
| engagement | x_like_set | write:engagement | ✅ | Like or unlike a post as the authenticated user. | |
| engagement | x_repost_set | write:engagement | ✅ | Repost (retweet) a post as the authenticated user, or undo that repost. | |
| engagement | x_bookmark_set | write:engagement | ✅ | Add a post to the authenticated user's bookmarks or remove it. | |
| engagement | x_bookmarks_list | read:content | ✅ | ✅ | The authenticated user's own bookmarks, newest first — the read half of x_bookmark_set. |
| timelines | x_timeline_home | read:content | ✅ | ✅ | Read the authenticated X (Twitter) user's home timeline in reverse-chronological order (the accounts they follow, newest first). |
| timelines | x_timeline_mentions | read:content | ✅ | Read posts mentioning an X (Twitter) user (defaults to the authenticated user). | |
| timelines | x_timeline_user | read:content | ✅ | Read an X (Twitter) user's own posts, newest first, optionally excluding replies and/or reposts, within optional time bounds. | |
| graph | x_follow_set | write:social-graph | ✅ | Follow or unfollow a user as the authenticated user. | |
| graph | x_mute_set | write:social-graph | ✅ | Mute or unmute a user as the authenticated user. | |
| graph | x_block_set | destructive:social-graph | ✅ | Block or unblock a user as the authenticated user. | |
| graph | x_followers_list | read:social-graph | ✅ | List the accounts following an X (Twitter) user. | |
| graph | x_following_list | read:social-graph | ✅ | List the accounts an X (Twitter) user follows. | |
| graph | x_user_search | read:user | ✅ | Keyword search over X (Twitter) user profiles (names, handles, bios). | |
| lists | x_list_create | write:content | ✅ | Create a list owned by the authenticated user. | |
| lists | x_list_update | write:content | ✅ | Update the authenticated user's own list metadata — name, description, and/or private. | |
| lists | x_list_delete | destructive:content | ✅ | Permanently delete the authenticated user's own list. | |
| lists | x_list_get | read:content | ✅ | Read one list's metadata — name, description, privacy, member and follower counts, and owner handle. | |
| lists | x_lists_owned | read:content | ✅ | The lists a user owns (defaults to the authenticated user). | |
| lists | x_list_member_set | write:content | ✅ | Add a user to the authenticated user's own list or remove one — a single user per call. | |
| lists | x_list_members | read:content | ✅ | The members of a list. | |
| lists | x_list_timeline | read:content | ✅ | Posts from a list's timeline (recent posts by its members). | |
| lists | x_list_follow_set | write:engagement | ✅ | Follow a list as the authenticated user, or unfollow it. | |
| lists | x_list_pin_set | write:engagement | ✅ | Pin a list in the authenticated user's list view, or unpin it. | |
| media | x_media_upload | write:content | ✅ | Upload a local image, GIF, or video via the chunked v2 flow and return a media_id to attach with x_post_create. | |
| media | x_media_status | read:content | ✅ | ✅ | Check the async processing state of an uploaded media by media_id. |
| dm | x_dm_events_list | read:dm | ✅ | ✅ | List all recent direct-message events across the authenticated X (Twitter) user's conversations, newest first. |
| dm | x_dm_conversation_events_list | read:dm | ✅ | ✅ | List the direct-message events of one X (Twitter) DM conversation, newest first. |
| dm | x_dm_participant_events_list | read:dm | ✅ | ✅ | List the direct-message events of the 1:1 X (Twitter) DM conversation with one participant, newest first. |
| dm | x_dm_send | write:dm | ✅ | Send an X (Twitter) direct message to exactly one target: an existing conversation (conversation_id) or a user (participant), creating the 1:1 conversation if needed. | |
| archive | x_search_archive | read:content | ✅ | Search the complete X (Twitter) archive back to 2006 using the full v2 query syntax (from:, to:, conversation_id:, boolean operators). | |
| archive | x_post_counts_archive | read:content | ✅ | Return a volume histogram (post counts per time bucket) for an X (Twitter) v2 query over the complete archive back to 2006, at minute/hour/day granularity. | |
| usage | x_usage_get | read:account | ✅ | Report the post-read consumption of the current billing cycle against the monthly project cap (with an optional per-day and per-app breakdown), alongside the local credit-spend estimate for this session. |
DM reads return ids, timestamps and participants only; message bodies require an explicit
include_text: true on the call.
Tool packages
| Package | Covers |
|---|---|
auth | Auth context and rate-limit windows. |
usage | Platform read-cap consumption and the local session-spend estimate. |
posts | Create, read and delete posts. |
search | Recent post search and volume counts. |
archive | Full-archive search and counts. |
timelines | Home, mentions and user timelines. |
engagement | Likes, reposts and bookmarks. |
users | User lookup. |
graph | Profile search, follow/mute/block, follower and following lists. |
lists | Full list lifecycle, membership, timeline, follow and pin. |
media | Chunked media upload and status. |
dm | Direct-message reads and sends (double-locked). |
Resources
MCP resources are planned — a read-only exposure of the resolved auth context and live rate-limit table as addressable resources. Not shipped.
Prompts
MCP prompts are planned — guided templates for common workflows (e.g. cost-aware posting, audience research). Not shipped.
Project structure
Ports & adapters; the module layout is fixed in
docs/02-architecture.md §3:
src/
├── index.ts # composition root + stdio wiring
├── core/ # config, policy, budget, errors, ports, tooldef,
│ # registry, render, resolve, paginate, sanitize
├── api/ # http, ratelimit, errors, oauth2/, endpoints/
├── tools/ # one module per package (posts, search, graph, …)
├── mcp/ # compose, server, schema, structured, gates, session
└── cli/ # dispatch, authorize, doctor
Dependency rule: tools → core + api/endpoints, api → core, mcp → tools + core,
cli → core + api. Nothing in core reaches outward or does I/O.
Security notes
A summary; the full threat model and operator checklist live in
SECURITY.md and docs/04-security.md.
- Host-scoped auth. The
Authorizationheader is attached only for the configured API origin; redirects are never followed on token-bearing requests (confused-deputy defense). Proxy environment variables are ignored. - Token file hardening. Written
0600withO_NOFOLLOW/O_EXCL; refresh is single-flight with reload-under-lock and fails closed rather than racing. - Untrusted content. Post/user/DM text returned to the model is marked as untrusted. Marking is not a semantic filter — the policy model is the real control against prompt injection.
- No escalation recipes. A denial on a sensitive cell (
*:dm,destructive:*,*:social-graph) names the blocked cell but never the variable that would unlock it, so the model cannot relay an escalation recipe to you. - Media default-deny. Uploads are refused unless the file
realpaths insideX_MCP_MEDIA_DIR. - Cost is model-immutable. The session credit budget is operator-set; the model cannot raise or disable it.
- Supply chain: pin the exact version. An unpinned
npx -y x-mcp-aiexecutes the newest publish on every client cold-start — in a process holding your tokens. Releases are published from CI with npm provenance. The npm package name isx-mcp-ai;x-mcpis only the repository name.
Data handling
Full statement: docs/12-privacy.md.
- Nothing phones home. No telemetry, no analytics, no update check. The project runs no server; the only outbound destination is the X API at your configured base URL.
- Credentials stay local. Client id/secret and bearer tokens live in the process
environment; OAuth tokens live in a
0600file on your machine. No tool ever returns a credential, anddoctormasks them. - Cost telemetry is local-only. The spend counter is in memory, per process, reported to the calling model and nowhere else.
- Content you read leaves X for your model. Posts, profiles and DM events fetched by a tool are returned to your MCP client and therefore reach its model provider. Nothing is cached or persisted by this server.
Documentation
| Page | For |
|---|---|
| 10 — Operator guide | Install, authorize, per-client config, env recipes, cost control. |
| 11 — Troubleshooting | Startup errors, doctor, auth/refresh, rate limits, missing tools. |
| 12 — Privacy & data handling | What is sent where, what is stored, how to delete it. |
| 01 — API landscape | Pay-per-use pricing, availability classes, platform caps. |
| 02 — Architecture | Module layout and the canonical env-var table. |
| 03 — Tool catalog | The designed tool surface and its classifications. |
| 04 — Security | Threat model, policy model, token lifecycle. |
Support
If this project saves you time, support is welcome:
Trademark
x-mcp-ai is an independent, unofficial project. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by X Corp. It talks to the official, publicly documented X API v2 and does not use any private, undocumented or scraping-based access.
"X", "Twitter", and related names, logos and marks are trademarks of X Corp. They are used here nominatively, only to describe what this software interoperates with. This project is released under the MIT License; trademark rights are not licensed.
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