Wg Easy MCP Server

wg-easy-mcp

A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for administering wg-easy (WireGuard Easy) instances.

Lets MCP clients like Claude Code, Claude Desktop or Codex manage your WireGuard VPN: list, create, update, enable/disable and delete clients, fetch configuration files and QR codes, and inspect the server status — all through the wg-easy v15 REST API.

Eleven tools is the ceiling, not the floor: WG_EASY_ALLOW_TOOLS=essential registers a curated six instead, and a model picks the right tool far more reliably from six than from eleven — see choosing which tools load.

What makes it different

The full client lifecycle over the wg-easy v15 REST API, including .conf files, QR codes and one-time download links.

Partial updates merge. An update reads the current client state and changes only the fields you named, instead of overwriting the rest with defaults.

disable_client stays ungated on purpose. Every other write asks a person first through MCP elicitation; that one only ever withdraws access, and making it harder would be making the safe move the slow one.

Requirements

• Node.js ≥ 22
• A running wg-easy v15+ instance
• 2FA (TOTP) must be disabled for the account used by this server — the wg-easy API only supports Basic Authentication and does not work with 2FA enabled

Note: The wg-easy REST API is not yet declared stable and may change between releases. This server targets wg-easy v15.

Configuration

Configuration is provided via environment variables:

Use https://. With a plain-http URL the Basic Auth credentials and all WireGuard private keys travel unencrypted; the server prints a warning unless the host is local. For self-signed certificates prefer a proper internal CA over WG_EASY_INSECURE_TLS.

Without credentials the server still starts and lists its tools (so registries and inspectors can introspect it), but every tool call fails with setup instructions instead of reaching the wg-easy API.

Choosing which tools load

WG_EASY_ALLOW_TOOLS and WG_EASY_DENY_TOOLS take comma-separated tool names; a trailing * matches a whole family. essential is a curated preset of six: get_server_info, list_clients, get_client, create_client, enable_client, disable_client.

get_client_config, get_client_qrcode and generate_one_time_link are not in it, and neither is delete_client: all four either destroy something irreversibly or hand out a peer's private key. Name them where you want them.

WG_EASY_ALLOW_TOOLS=essential
WG_EASY_ALLOW_TOOLS=essential,get_client_config
WG_EASY_ALLOW_TOOLS=list_clients,get_client_config
WG_EASY_DENY_TOOLS=delete_client,create_client

An entry that matches no tool aborts startup and names it, so a typo cannot silently hide a tool — an absent tool is not something anyone traces back to an environment variable. A filtered tool is never registered, so it is absent from tools/list and unknown to tools/call alike, exactly like a write tool under WG_EASY_READ_ONLY.

If you run several of these servers at once, mcp-hub is the other answer — its /hub endpoint replaces every server's tools with six meta-tools.

Installation

Claude Code

claude mcp add wg-easy -s user \
  -e WG_EASY_URL=https://vpn.example.com:51821 \
  -e WG_EASY_USERNAME=admin \
  -e WG_EASY_PASSWORD=your-password \
  -- npx -y wg-easy-mcp

Claude Desktop

Add to your claude_desktop_config.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "wg-easy": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "wg-easy-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "WG_EASY_URL": "https://vpn.example.com:51821",
        "WG_EASY_USERNAME": "admin",
        "WG_EASY_PASSWORD": "your-password"
      }
    }
  }
}

Codex

Add to your ~/.codex/config.toml:

[mcp_servers.wg-easy]
command = "npx"
args = ["-y", "wg-easy-mcp"]
env = { WG_EASY_URL = "https://vpn.example.com:51821", WG_EASY_USERNAME = "admin", WG_EASY_PASSWORD = "your-password" }

From source

git clone https://github.com/ni-c/wg-easy-mcp.git
cd wg-easy-mcp
npm install
npm run build
# then use `node /path/to/wg-easy-mcp/dist/index.js` as the command

Docker

A multi-arch image (linux/amd64, linux/arm64) with an SBOM and build provenance is published to GitHub Container Registry:

docker run -i --rm \
  -e WG_EASY_URL=https://vpn.example.com:51821 \
  -e WG_EASY_USERNAME=admin \
  -e WG_EASY_PASSWORD=your-password \
  ghcr.io/ni-c/wg-easy-mcp:latest

The image talks MCP over stdio, so clients need docker run -i (no port is exposed):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "wg-easy": {
      "command": "docker",
      "args": [
        "run",
        "-i",
        "--rm",
        "-e",
        "WG_EASY_URL",
        "-e",
        "WG_EASY_USERNAME",
        "-e",
        "WG_EASY_PASSWORD",
        "ghcr.io/ni-c/wg-easy-mcp:latest"
      ],
      "env": {
        "WG_EASY_URL": "https://vpn.example.com:51821",
        "WG_EASY_USERNAME": "admin",
        "WG_EASY_PASSWORD": "your-password"
      }
    }
  }
}

Through mcp-hub

A client that cannot spawn a local process — ChatGPT connectors, Claude on the web, Cursor, LibreChat — reaches wg-easy-mcp through mcp-hub: one container serves many stdio MCP servers over Streamable HTTP, with an OAuth 2.1 login behind a single password and long-lived tokens for the clients that cannot do OAuth. Its /hub endpoint puts every server behind six meta-tools, so one connector reaches all of them without N×tool schemas in the model's context, and it speaks both protocol revisions — a question this server asks travels through it to the person at the far end.

Its /config/mcp.json uses Claude Code's format, so the entry is the one you already have:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "wg-easy": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "wg-easy-mcp"],
      "env": { "WG_EASY_ALLOW_TOOLS": "essential" },
      "denyTools": ["delete_client"]
    }
  }
}

allowTools and denyTools there are the hub's own per-server filter, which is not the same thing as *_ALLOW_TOOLS in env — the difference, and the mistake it invites, are in the client guide.

Tools

👤 asks a person through MCP elicitation · falls back to a two-call confirm_token where the client cannot show a dialog.

Structured output

Every tool declares an outputSchema and answers with structuredContent alongside the text block, so a client can use the result without parsing prose:

{
  "untrusted": true,
  "source": "wg-easy",
  "count": 2,
  "clients": [{ "id": 1, "name": "laptop", "enabled": true }],
}

The untrusted marker is a field and not only a sentence in the text, because a client that reads the structured half and ignores the text would otherwise get free-form client names, DNS entries and endpoints with no framing at all. Every tool carries it except delete_client, which reports an id this server was given and nothing that came back from the instance.

Three answers changed shape to fit, and all three for the same reason: a schema whose root is not an object is served to a 2025-era client rewritten as {result: …}, so the tool would answer differently depending on who asked.

An oversized answer is now shortened as an object rather than cut as a string: the longest text field is shortened first, then list entries are dropped, and a truncated field says what was cut and how much there was. A document sliced at a byte offset is not a smaller answer, it is an unparseable one — and the two channels have to carry the same value.

What wg-easy sends is described with every field optional and unknown fields allowed; only what this server builds is exact. The SDK validates each result against its schema before it goes out, so a stricter shape would turn a wg-easy release that adds a field into a tool that fails outright.

Safety

• Five tools ask a person, not just the model. create_client, update_client, enable_client, delete_client and generate_one_time_link raise a real dialog through MCP elicitation where the client supports it. Only one of the five destroys anything — the others issue a VPN credential, re-arm one, can widen a route, and mint an unauthenticated URL that hands out a private key. disable_client is the one write tool that never asks: it can only withdraw access. Where the client cannot show a dialog they fall back to a random token valid for 5 minutes and bound to the exact target (for update_client, to the exact edit), which proves the call was made twice with the same arguments and nothing more. ELICITATION=false takes that fallback deliberately; it never removes the guard. See Asking a person.
• Key material is redacted everywhere it is not the point. A field name is matched by its suffix — password, passwd, passphrase, secret, token, apiKey, privateKey, preSharedKey, plus anything starting with totp — so metricsPassword, which carries the argon2 hash of the metrics token, is covered along with every other <prefix>Secret wg-easy invents. (key is not a suffix: it would take publicKey with it.) Values are replaced with [redacted] at every nesting level — in get_server_info's admin responses, which carry the WireGuard server key, and in list_clients and get_client, which carry each client's own key. Live one-time-link tokens are redacted from the same two, because GET /cnf/<token> serves the whole configuration with no login at all; expiresAt survives, so a listing still shows that a link is live. get_client_config, get_client_qrcode and generate_one_time_link are the deliberate exceptions: handing a peer its configuration is what they are for, and somebody asked.
• Everything the wg-easy API returns carries an explicit untrusted-data marker and a 60 000-character budget, measured on the text that is actually emitted. Client names, DNS entries and endpoints are free-form strings, so they are marked as data to report rather than instructions to follow, control characters and BiDi overrides are stripped from them (field names included), and a single oversized field cannot flood the model's context.
• Nothing the instance sends is taken on trust. Every field an output schema types is checked at the boundary and left out when it does not hold, so one record with a string id or a 1e999 cannot take a whole listing down with Output validation error. Entries that are not client records at all are counted in skipped rather than dropped in silence.
• Response bodies have a ceiling (8 MiB, refused on a declared content-length before a byte is read) and the status is read before the body, so a 401 behind a large proxy page is still a 401. A refused login is repeated from memory for ten seconds rather than retried.
• A WG_EASY_URL containing embedded credentials (user:password@host) is rejected at startup — they would otherwise be echoed in the startup log and prefixed onto every request. Only its origin and path are kept, and no startup diagnostic echoes a value back.
• Upstream error bodies are labelled as untrusted, stripped of control characters and cut at 200 characters; HTML error pages (reverse proxies) are dropped before being returned to the MCP client.
• Caller input has a length: names and filters at 200 characters, addresses at 64, list parameters at 64 entries, and a client id bounded in its pattern rather than after Number().
• WG_EASY_INSECURE_TLS only relaxes certificate validation for the wg-easy connection — it does not disable TLS verification process-wide.
• WG_EASY_READ_ONLY=true registers list_clients, get_client and get_server_info, and nothing else. get_client_config and get_client_qrcode are reads and still not in that set: what they read is a client's private key in the clear, and a read-only mode that leaves key disclosure standing is not the mode its name promises.
• Tools carry MCP annotations (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint) so hosts can apply appropriate permission policies.
• Keep in mind that get_client_config and get_client_qrcode return the client's private key, and a generate_one_time_link URL allows an unauthenticated config download — treat tool output as sensitive.

The full trust model is in SECURITY.md and, in prose, at wg-easy-mcp.ni-c.de/guide/security.

Not exposed, on purpose

wg-easy v15 or newer only. Older versions expose a different, session-based API that this server does not implement.

No server administration. The tools cover the client lifecycle; the instance's own configuration, its admin accounts and its host stay outside the tool list.

Safety

• Five tools ask a person first, through MCP elicitation: create_client, update_client, enable_client, delete_client and generate_one_time_link. Only one of them destroys anything — the others are on the list because destructiveHint is the wrong axis for what they do. A new client is a credential that reaches every network behind the VPN, update_client can widen serverAllowedIps, and enable_client re-arms a key pair that is already installed on a peer.
• The approval is bound to the exact edit, so approving a rename does not license a later call that widens the routes.
• disable_client deliberately stays ungated: it only ever withdraws access, and making the safe move the slow one would be the wrong trade.
• Client names, addresses and the instance's own strings are marked as untrusted data, and oversized output is truncated with the omission stated.
• WG_EASY_READ_ONLY=true registers the read tools and nothing else.

Documentation

The full guide, tool reference and security notes live at wg-easy-mcp.ni-c.de (source in docs/).

Development

npm install
npm run build     # compile TypeScript to dist/
npm test          # run the vitest test suite
npm run lint      # oxlint + prettier check
npm run test:coverage

CI runs the suite on Node 22 and 24 and adds npm audit, CodeQL and a Trivy scan of the container image on both architectures. See CONTRIBUTING.md.

The documentation site lives in docs/ with its own manifest:

cd docs && npm install && npm run dev

Releasing

1. Bump the version in package.json and add a CHANGELOG.md entry.
2. Commit, then tag and push: git tag -a vX.Y.Z -m "vX.Y.Z" && git push origin main vX.Y.Z

The release workflow runs the test suite, publishes to npm (via trusted publishing, no token, with provenance), creates a GitHub release from the changelog entry and updates the entry in the official MCP Registry (io.github.ni-c/wg-easy-mcp, via GitHub OIDC). The container image is published to GHCR by the CI workflow on the same tag.

server.json lists both an npm and an OCI package; the registry job syncs the version into both before publishing. If it ever fails, fix main and re-run mcp-registry.yml via workflow_dispatch — re-running the tag job checks out the old tree.

Releasing

Releases are tag-driven. Bump package.json, move the [Unreleased] notes in CHANGELOG.md under the new version, commit, then:

git tag -s vX.Y.Z -m "vX.Y.Z"
git push origin main vX.Y.Z

The release workflow publishes to npm via Trusted Publishing (OIDC, with provenance), pushes the multi-arch container image to GHCR, creates the GitHub release from the CHANGELOG section, and updates the entry in the official MCP registry.

Contributing

Issues, discussions and pull requests are welcome — see CONTRIBUTING.md. For vulnerabilities please use private reporting rather than a public issue; the policy is in SECURITY.md.

License

MIT © Willi Thiel