Server data from the Official MCP Registry
76 flat-1bp routes; Solana SOL to Base USDC; caller-approved unsigned actions; never signs/submits.
About
76 flat-1bp routes; Solana SOL to Base USDC; caller-approved unsigned actions; never signs/submits.
Remote endpoints: streamable-http: https://api.assetfare.dev/mcp
Security Report
Valid MCP server (2 strong, 2 medium validity signals). 1 known CVE in dependencies Imported from the Official MCP Registry.
22 tools verified · Open access · 1 issue found
Security scores are indicators to help you make informed decisions, not guarantees. Always review permissions before connecting any MCP server.
Permissions Required
This plugin requests these system permissions. Most are normal for its category.
How to Connect
Remote Plugin
No local installation needed. Your AI client connects to the remote endpoint directly.
Add this to your MCP configuration to connect:
{
"mcpServers": {
"io-github-odaiin-assetfare": {
"url": "https://api.assetfare.dev/mcp"
}
}
}Documentation
View on GitHubFrom the project's GitHub README.
AssetFare — non-custodial bridge and cross-chain swap for AI agents
USDC bridge API for AI agents and agent-wallet funding: Solana to Base plus 76 cross-chain routes, each with a validated ordered provider path and exact 1bp fee step. Caller approves and signs; the server never signs or submits.
Core 2.4.1 quotes also include strict continuation_v3. MCP 1.2.0 verifies the
canonical full-quote hash, route-summary hash and fingerprint claim, exact
path/providers, caller wallet-chain and event-signer requirements, base-unit
bounds, allowed mode and TTL. Every quote remains unranked_candidate; no
adapter selects it automatically, and caller_approved:true alone is not
human-approval proof.
The portable quote hash removes continuation_v3, replaces duplicated raw
base-unit numbers with the exact decimal strings in direct_route_summary,
then hashes AssetFare typed-canonical-v1 bytes. That encoding preserves JSON
type, uses exact IEEE-754 binary64 bytes for finite numbers, UTF-8 byte lengths
and byte-sorted object keys, distinguishes -0 from 0, and rejects every
non-substituted integral number outside JavaScript's safe-integer range. The required literal
quote_payload_sha256_spec appears both on continuation_v3 and in its
fingerprint claim, preventing numeric-string collisions and cross-language
precision ambiguity.
AssetFare is an agent-native, non-custodial native-USDC bridge and cross-chain route service. Solana native USDC → Base native USDC is the canonical route: an agent gets a fresh quote and, only after explicit caller approval, a bounded unsigned transaction plan the caller verifies and signs. AssetFare also provides bridge and cross-chain swap routes across six chains and eleven source endpoints, and 76 directed routes. AssetFare service fee 1bp; Circle/provider/network fees additional; quote exposes total token-path cost and live availability; server never signs/submits. Solana SOL → Base USDC and Optimism USDC → Base USDC are also supported. AssetFare never receives private keys, signs, or submits.
For economic evaluation, use USD 1,000 as the primary representative amount and always requote every candidate at the amount actually intended. The API still accepts USD 1, but USD 1 is reachability/schema smoke only, not a meaningful competitiveness test. For native-USDC routes, USD 50 is the lowest observed competitive bucket and a reasonable evaluation starting point based on dated 2026-09-23 evidence; it does not guarantee AssetFare is cheapest. SOL-input routes include a swap, so evaluate their full swap-and-bridge path at USD 1,000 or the actual intended amount. AssetFare is always one candidate, not an automatically preferred route.
Verify before trusting: public source, Ed25519-signed manifest, public key, security.txt, and on-chain execution evidence. Quotes are estimates; compare fresh executable route outputs.
Every v2 quote includes direct_route_summary, an intent-bound ordered
provider path with normalized chain:asset endpoints, exact base-unit amount
bounds as decimal strings, the single AssetFare 1bp fee step, and
server-signing/server-submission=false. direct_protocol_only means every step
uses a disclosed direct protocol. external_intent marks Across for Robinhood
ingress, where provider-internal liquidity sourcing may occur.
route_aggregator_used=false describes AssetFare's own engine and does not
claim every provider avoids internal aggregation. Circle/provider costs remain
in cost_summary.provider_fee_components; network gas is in unpriced_costs.
continuation_v3 binds the entire quote (excluding the continuation object
itself) to a process-local, maximum-60-second Core cache. A later exact
approval_v3 selects one_shot or session, may only strengthen the quote's
maximum-input/minimum-output bounds, and fails closed after expiry, restart,
path/provider drift, wallet/signer requirement drift, mode conflict or replay.
Multi-step routes are session-only. Omitting approval_v3 is explicitly
legacy_advisory; the boolean gate remains required but is not human proof.
Independent agent verifier
The dependency-free assetfare-verify CLI verifies evidence instead of
accepting an AssetFare pass, safe, score, or verdict field. From this
checkout, live verification is explicit:
node scripts/assetfare-verify.mjs --live
A package release that contains the assetfare-verify bin entry can be invoked
with npx --yes --package=assetfare-mcp assetfare-verify --live. Do not pin an
older package version that predates this command.
Live mode uses the public Ed25519 key and key id embedded in the verifier. It
fetches only the pinned manifest and its hash-bound safety bundle, rejects
redirects, unexpected MIME types, non-canonical JSON, unknown/missing schema
keys, oversized responses, expired manifests, and subjective safety claims. It
then obtains eth_chainId and exact eth_getCode bytes from two independently
pinned public RPC providers on every supported EVM chain. The raw bytes must
agree with one another and with both the bundle's SHA-256 and Ethereum
Keccak-256 evidence. These are read-only calls; the command has no signing or
transaction-submission path.
For deterministic or air-gapped checking, pass all three trust-material files explicitly:
node scripts/assetfare-verify.mjs --offline \
--manifest ./fixtures/manifest.json \
--bundle ./fixtures/safety-bundle.json \
--pubkey ./fixtures/assetfare-manifest.pub
Offline mode makes no network requests. It verifies the supplied manifest
signature, the signed bundle hash, exact schemas and claims, release/build/
deployment provenance, all five EVM chains, and every embedded raw runtime-code
hash. Its successful status is offline_evidence_verified, not a live RPC
quorum result. npm run verify-selftest creates deterministic local fixtures
and exercises bad signatures, bad bundle hashes and schemas, redirects, MIME
confusion, chain/code disagreements, incomplete RPC evidence, and forbidden
subjective claims.
AssetFare is maintained by a distributed project team using one public release namespace during the pilot. Roles, release controls, and the current public owner are documented in GOVERNANCE.md and MAINTAINERS.md; this is not a claim of incorporation or independent third-party audit.
Interfaces: MCP + A2A + REST/OpenAPI.
This repository contains an optional MCP adapter. The primary remote endpoint
exposes nine current v2 tools: signed manifest, capabilities, quote, one-shot
caller-approved prepare, and the five session-lifecycle operations. The 13
unversioned legacy tools remain available at the separate /mcp/legacy
compatibility endpoint for the original Solana SOL → Base/Arbitrum ETH workflow.
The two profiles never appear together on a remote endpoint.
Agents can also evaluate any current v2 route without installing or connecting
MCP:
- APIs.json:
https://assetfare.dev/apis.json - Capabilities:
https://api.assetfare.dev/v2/capabilities - OpenAPI v2:
https://api.assetfare.dev/v2/openapi.json - Provider status:
https://api.assetfare.dev/v2/status - Read-only Arazzo workflow:
https://assetfare.dev/arazzo.yaml - Independent agent pilot:
https://assetfare.dev/pilot/
Safety model
- AssetFare MCP never accepts a private key and never signs or submits a transaction.
- Every one of the 76 routes models and collects an AssetFare service fee of exactly 1bp at one eligible successful atomic action; no route is fee-free. The 1bp is not the total cost: Circle (including any fixed CCTP forwarding fee), provider, and network fees are additional and appear in the quote's total token-path cost.
assetfare_v2_capabilitiesandassetfare_v2_quoteexpose the primary eleven-endpoint, 76-route v2 scope. Availability is live, not static: check it in capabilities/quote before preparing. Polygon and Optimism are directional native-USDC source-only origins to Base or Arbitrum USDC.assetfare_v2_prepareandassetfare_v2_session_createaccept an optional strictapproval_v3. Its selected mode is schema-bound (one_shotversussession), and session approval must use the same idempotency key. Without it, the path islegacy_advisory. Each call still requires the caller to supply literalcaller_approved:true; the adapters never insert it and never describe it as human proof. Private key/seed/signed-transaction inputs are refused.- A session capability is a sensitive bearer credential, never a private key. Remote clients generate 32 random bytes locally, encode them as base64url without padding, and supply it only in
X-AssetFare-Session-Token. The server stores only its hash. The remote MCP/A2A service never generates the secret;assetfare-plankeeps it in memory by default and writes it only to an explicit new mode-0600 file. The optional local stdio helper remains offline-only. - The unversioned MCP quote/status and all MCP authentication/session/action tools are isolated at
/mcp/legacyfor original-corridor compatibility only. - MCP state-changing tools only create authentication/session records or prepare/verify unsigned legacy workflow actions. MCP clients should require user approval for those calls.
- The caller independently verifies every returned unsigned action and signs/submits with its own wallets.
Remote endpoint
https://api.assetfare.dev/mcp
Official MCP Registry server: io.github.odaiin/assetfare (legacy registry
namespace; the canonical source owner is the assetfare GitHub organization).
The Registry listing is externally blocked at 0.4.11 while
namespace migration #1666
is unresolved; npm, the public source, and the hosted server are the current
1.2.0 authorities. Do not create a duplicate io.github.assetfare/* listing
to bypass the migration.
Primary MCP quote scope: 76 directed routes across eleven v2 source endpoints,
with a $1 minimum and no adapter-enforced maximum; live upstream availability
and liquidity still apply. Each route charges an AssetFare service fee of
exactly 1bp; Circle/provider/network fees are additional, and each quote
exposes total token-path cost and live availability.
Canonical examples are solana:SOL → base:USDC, solana:USDC → base:USDC,
and optimism:USDC → base:USDC. Polygon and Optimism contribute exactly four
directional native-USDC source-only routes to Base and Arbitrum USDC. The
unversioned legacy workflow remains limited to solana:SOL → base:ETH and
solana:SOL → arbitrum:ETH; it does not limit the v2 route matrix.
The USD 1 API minimum is for reachability/schema smoke only. Start native-USDC economic comparisons at USD 50 based on the dated 2026-09-23 evidence, without assuming AssetFare will be cheapest. Use USD 1,000 as the primary representative comparison amount, including for SOL-input routes whose path includes a swap, and always compare fresh executable quotes at the actual intended amount.
For a new evaluation, call assetfare_v2_capabilities and then
assetfare_v2_quote. The primary endpoint has no legacy tools to misselect.
Existing unversioned clients can connect to
https://api.assetfare.dev/mcp/legacy; new clients must not use it.
REST/OpenAPI first call
Use the public v2 quote endpoint when an agent has not explicitly connected MCP. No API key, wallet authentication, session, signature, or transaction is required for this read-only evaluation call:
curl -sS https://api.assetfare.dev/v2/quote \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"from_chain":"solana","from_token":"USDC","to_chain":"base","to_token":"USDC","amount_usd":1000}'
From a cloned repository, the dependency-free examples are:
node examples/rest-quote.mjs 1000 solana USDC base USDC
python3 examples/rest_quote.py 1000 solana USDC base USDC
For a one-command, agent-readable evaluation that verifies the signed release manifest and remains strictly quote-only:
npx --yes --package=assetfare-mcp@1.2.0 assetfare-route-eval \
--amount 1000 --from-chain solana --from-token USDC --to-chain base --to-token USDC
From a cloned repository, the equivalent command is npm run route-eval -- ....
For a server-enforced quote → explicit selection → unsigned-plan flow, first
save the exact fresh REST or MCP quote as quote.json. Then select a mode and
bounds offline (zero network requests):
npx --yes --package=assetfare-mcp@1.2.0 assetfare-select \
--quote quote.json --mode session \
--maximum-input-base <CONTINUATION_MAXIMUM_INPUT_BASE> \
--minimum-output-base <CONTINUATION_MINIMUM_OUTPUT_BASE> \
--output approval.json
npx --yes --package=assetfare-mcp@1.2.0 assetfare-plan \
--caller-approved --mode session \
--quote quote.json --approval approval.json \
--wallet solana=<CALLER_SOLANA_PUBLIC_KEY> \
--wallet base=<CALLER_BASE_PUBLIC_ADDRESS> \
--event-signer-public <CALLER_OWNED_SOLANA_PUBLIC_KEY> \
--session-token-output ./session-capability.json
assetfare-select refuses expired/tampered quotes, weak bounds, one-shot on a
multi-step path, existing output files and secret material. It writes the exact
approval object with mode 0600 and never claims that selection proves human
approval. assetfare-plan validates both files and their exact hashes, makes
only the selected prepare/session POST, checks the returned path/provider/bounds
and ActionSafetyReceiptV1/raw/action/bundle hashes, and stops unsigned and
unsubmitted. Session tokens never appear in stdout or structured results. The
optional token output path must not exist and is created mode 0600; omit it only
if loss of recovery after process exit is acceptable.
The evaluator defaults to the representative USD 1,000
solana:USDC -> base:USDC request. That USDC result is one AssetFare candidate,
not a cross-provider market comparison. If solana:SOL -> base:ETH is requested
explicitly, it also requests same-input Relay and Mayan snapshots with
placeholder public addresses. Those comparison rows are not executable orders;
every provider must be requoted with the caller's real addresses and actual
intended amount before selection or signing.
Read-only framework integrations are available for Coinbase AgentKit and GOAT, plus project-reviewed (a project-authored repository review, not independent third-party assurance) SendAI Solana Agent Kit plugin and elizaOS plugin, plus quote tools for Agenti. None of these integrations exposes preparation, signing, submission, funding, swap, or bridge execution.
Dify agents can install the reviewed AssetFare Marketplace plugin. It exposes two native REST tools—live capabilities and one route quote—with no credentials, wallet, authentication, session, preparation, signing, submission, swap, or bridge execution tool.
Hugging Face smolagents users can load the reviewed
quote tool or
capabilities tool
from free Static Spaces. Hub tools execute remote code locally: inspect
tool.py, set trust_remote_code=True, and pin the documented immutable
revision. The complete source and tests are in
assetfare/smolagents-assetfare.
A2A v1 quote adapter
AssetFare also exposes a read-only A2A v1 interface for agents that discover and invoke Agent Cards without MCP:
- canonical Agent Card:
https://api.assetfare.dev/.well-known/agent-card.json - legacy discovery alias returning the identical card:
https://api.assetfare.dev/.well-known/agent.json - JSON-RPC v1 endpoint:
https://api.assetfare.dev/a2a - protocol: official
@a2a-js/sdkv1,A2A-Version: 1.0,Content-Type: application/json
The read-only quote skill accepts one structured DataPart containing
fromChain, fromToken, toChain, toToken, and amountUsd. It calls the
public v2 capabilities, status, and quote endpoints and returns one quote with
its passed-through caller_action_plan_handoff. amountUsd must be finite and
at least 1; the adapter imposes no maximum, while live upstream availability
and liquidity still apply. Two additional caller-approved A2A
skills mirror the MCP execution tools: a one-shot prepare operation and the full session lifecycle
(session_create, session_get, observe_source, observe_output,
refresh_action). Before calling session_create, the A2A client generates
its session token locally; the remote A2A endpoint deliberately exposes no
token-generation operation. Each execution operation requires an explicit
callerApproved:true and the caller's public wallet addresses; AssetFare never
signs or submits, and only the caller's own submitted transaction hashes are
observed.
A card fetch, registry health check, TCK request, or registry-generated
SendMessage probe is discovery/conformance traffic, not customer demand.
The public endpoint was checked with official a2aproject/a2a-tck commit
263b9cfa: all 55 applicable MUST checks passed. Five generic TCK SUT fixture
tests send fixed TextPart payloads with magic messageId prefixes and require
unrelated text/file/data artifacts. They are deliberately not implemented by
this structured non-custodial agent; the exception is disclosed rather than
presented as a full 100% pass.
Connect a remote MCP client directly—no package installation or AssetFare API key is required:
claude mcp add --transport http assetfare https://api.assetfare.dev/mcp
{
"mcpServers": {
"assetfare": {
"url": "https://api.assetfare.dev/mcp"
}
}
}
Codex CLI and app
Add the remote server from the CLI:
codex mcp add assetfare --url https://api.assetfare.dev/mcp
Or add it to ~/.codex/config.toml or a project .codex/config.toml. The
writes approval mode prompts for tools that are not annotated read-only:
[mcp_servers.assetfare]
url = "https://api.assetfare.dev/mcp"
default_tools_approval_mode = "writes"
Gemini CLI
gemini mcp add --transport http assetfare https://api.assetfare.dev/mcp
Equivalent ~/.gemini/settings.json entry:
{
"mcpServers": {
"assetfare": {
"url": "https://api.assetfare.dev/mcp",
"type": "http",
"trust": false
}
}
}
Cursor
Add the following server to a project .cursor/mcp.json or the global
~/.cursor/mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"assetfare": {
"url": "https://api.assetfare.dev/mcp"
}
}
}
Connecting is unauthenticated. The primary endpoint uses caller-owned public wallets and, for session mode, a client-generated capability. Only the separate legacy endpoint uses the wallet-bound token produced by the old signMessage flow; never place either capability in an MCP configuration file.
Agent skill
The portable Agent Skill is skills/assetfare-route/SKILL.md.
Skills.lc-compatible clients can install it directly from this public GitHub repository.
npx --yes skills add assetfare/assetfare-mcp --skill assetfare-route -g -y
Portable Agent Plugin
Clients that support the published vendor-neutral Agent Plugins 1.0 format can
install this repository from its Git URL. The current plugins CLI can install
the same MCP connection and AssetFare route-evaluation skill through the
included compatibility metadata:
npx plugins add assetfare/assetfare-mcp
The primary MCP endpoint is v2-only. Legacy wallet-auth/session tools are
isolated at /mcp/legacy. AssetFare never receives private keys, signs, or
submits, and the skill keeps REST/OpenAPI v2 as the primary evaluation path.
Circle Agent Stack and other shell-capable agents can use the same skill and
public REST/OpenAPI flow; see integrations/circle-agent-stack.
First-call evaluation
Run npm run first-call-eval to verify a fresh MCP client can discover the
primary v2 quote-only tools, validate current capabilities, and obtain a
representative USD 1,000 Solana-native-USDC to Base-native-USDC quote without
creating a wallet login, session, action, signature, or transaction. Legacy
tools are absent from the primary endpoint. Use USD 1 only for a deliberate
reachability/schema smoke test.
Use Streamable HTTP. The endpoint has no server-side API key. Read-only v2 tools never authenticate a wallet; prepare/session tools require explicit caller approval and public wallets. Legacy wallet authentication is a separate endpoint.
Local stdio
The repository also contains a stdio-compatible all-tools wrapper for self-hosting, including the local-only session-capability helper. The public Registry entry uses the lean v2-only Streamable HTTP endpoint. Package and Registry releases remain separately reviewed from remote deployment.
npm release publishing
npm releases use GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publishing through
.github/workflows/publish-npm.yml. The workflow is manually dispatched with
an existing immutable v<package-version> GitHub release tag, verifies that
the exact tag is on main and matches package.json, runs the complete package
checks and production audit, refuses an already-published version, and publishes
with short-lived OIDC credentials. No npm write token is stored in GitHub or
this repository.
The npm trusted-publisher record is pinned to GitHub organization assetfare,
repository assetfare-mcp, and workflow filename publish-npm.yml. Direct
npm publish is allowed only for that workflow. Package settings should require
2FA and disallow traditional tokens after the OIDC connection is verified.
Integration npm releases
The three unscoped integration packages use a separate, package-allowlisted release path. Their immutable tags are pinned exactly as follows:
assetfare-agentkit-action-provider-v0.1.1assetfare-elizaos-route-plugin-v0.1.1assetfare-solana-agent-kit-plugin-v0.1.1
release-integration-provenance.yml accepts only those three package choices.
It requires the corresponding lightweight tag to resolve to a commit signed by
the pinned AssetFare release key and contained in main, requires an already
published non-draft GitHub release, runs the package's locked checks, tests,
build, production audit, and pack verification, then uploads exactly the npm
tarball and its SHA-256 file and records GitHub build provenance. It never
publishes to npm.
Both workflows must be dispatched with --ref set to that package's exact tag,
never main or another branch/tag. They require GITHUB_REF to equal
refs/tags/<exact-package-tag> and GITHUB_SHA to equal the signed tag commit;
the tag itself must contain the same two workflow files and pinned signer data.
For example, after the trusted-publisher prerequisite below is complete, the
provenance phase for AgentKit is selected with
gh workflow run release-integration-provenance.yml --ref assetfare-agentkit-action-provider-v0.1.1 -f package=assetfare-agentkit-action-provider.
The publish phase uses the same --ref and package choice with
publish-integration-npm.yml only after provenance succeeds.
publish-integration-npm.yml accepts the same allowlist and version 0.1.1. It
repeats the signed-tag, release, manifest, lockfile, test, build, audit, and pack
checks; downloads only the two exact release assets; verifies GitHub's asset
digest, SHA-256 file, GitHub attestation, package identity, and byte-for-byte
reproducibility; then publishes that downloaded tarball with short-lived OIDC
credentials. An existing registry version is accepted only when its shasum
matches exactly; a conflict fails closed. The final gate requires the expected
latest tag, shasum, and npm SLSA provenance.
Do not dispatch either integration release workflow until the target npm
package's Settings → Trusted Publisher entry is configured and independently
checked with organization assetfare, repository assetfare-mcp, exact
workflow filename publish-integration-npm.yml, no environment, and direct
npm publish permission. Configure that exact entry separately for all three
packages. Do not substitute publish-npm.yml, a fork, a differently named
workflow, or an npm write token. The existing root v1.x provenance and publish
workflows remain separate and unchanged.
Trust material
- Security contact:
security@assetfare.dev - Security policy and private reporting:
https://github.com/assetfare/assetfare-mcp/security/policy - Signed manifest:
https://api.assetfare.dev/.well-known/assetfare-manifest.json - Public signing key:
https://assetfare.dev/.well-known/assetfare-manifest.pub - Continuously revalidated operator ownership:
https://api.assetfare.dev/.well-known/owners.json - Six-chain source status:
https://api.assetfare.dev/v2/status - Six-chain source capabilities:
https://api.assetfare.dev/v2/capabilities - Primary OpenAPI v2:
https://api.assetfare.dev/v2/openapi.json - Legacy MCP-backed v1 OpenAPI:
https://api.assetfare.dev/openapi.json - APIs.json:
https://assetfare.dev/apis.json - Arazzo:
https://assetfare.dev/arazzo.yaml - Server card:
https://api.assetfare.dev/.well-known/mcp/server-card.json - A2A Agent Card:
https://api.assetfare.dev/.well-known/agent-card.json - A2A endpoint:
https://api.assetfare.dev/a2a - Agent guide:
https://assetfare.dev/llms-full.txt - Mainnet evidence:
https://assetfare.dev/evidence/ - Paired route evidence:
evidence/solana-base-paired-quotes-20260916.md - Agent-payment route evidence:
evidence/solana-base-usdc-paired-quotes-20260916.md - Live same-input comparison:
https://assetfare.dev/compare/solana-to-base/ - Dated Solana USDC → Base USDC comparison ($250, 2026-09-23; explicit non-all-in and non-identical-lane caveats):
https://assetfare.dev/compare/solana-usdc-to-base-usdc/
Discovery
- Official MCP Registry:
io.github.odaiin/assetfare(legacy namespace pending Registry migration) - MCP Servers:
https://mcpservers.org/servers/assetfare/assetfare-mcp - Smithery:
https://smithery.ai/servers/twotw55/assetfare - Glama:
https://glama.ai/mcp/connectors/io.github.odaiin/assetfare - Agent Skill:
https://www.skills.sh/assetfare/assetfare-mcp/assetfare-route - Dify Marketplace:
https://marketplace.dify.ai/plugin/odaiin/assetfare - Hugging Face quote tool:
https://huggingface.co/spaces/odaiin/assetfare-quote(canonical reviewed revision401ecf835a3e0c95807c245a208eeda81b0d9b81) - Hugging Face capabilities tool:
https://huggingface.co/spaces/odaiin/assetfare-capabilities(canonical reviewed revision995b5c5be4d88a6c94241ef22ac3a6581dfa8cdb) - A2A Registry:
https://a2aregistry.org/agents/d4f9ab1a-904c-4227-8fc6-548e45749de1 - ARD:
https://assetfare.dev/.well-known/ard.json
The wrapper deliberately contains no AssetFare route engine, wallets, RPC credentials, or internal operations data.
Agent use case
For any supported six-chain source request, an agent first reads v2 capabilities and
requests a fresh quote through REST/OpenAPI or the read-only
assetfare_v2_quote MCP tool. Only an existing original-corridor client should
connect separately to /mcp/legacy. The caller independently signs and submits
every on-chain action; this MCP server never does.
See the first-call evaluation script, the public mainnet evidence at https://assetfare.dev/evidence/, and the end-to-end case study at https://assetfare.dev/case-studies/solana-to-base-mainnet-canary/.
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