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MCP server for security-vetting third-party AI agent extensions: 41 detection rules.
MCP server for security-vetting third-party AI agent extensions: 41 detection rules.
This is a well-designed security-vetting MCP server with strong code structure, proper input validation, and appropriate permissions for its stated purpose. The server analyzes third-party AI skills for security risks using 41 detection rules. Minor quality findings exist around logging of file paths and test coverage, but these are not security-critical. The server does not require authentication for local operations, which is appropriate for a local analysis tool. Supply chain analysis found 4 known vulnerabilities in dependencies (0 critical, 3 high severity). Package verification found 1 issue.
5 files analyzed · 10 issues found
Security scores are indicators to help you make informed decisions, not guarantees. Always review permissions before connecting any MCP server.
This plugin requests these system permissions. Most are normal for its category.
Add this to your MCP configuration file:
{
"mcpServers": {
"io-github-temurkhan13-openclaw-skill-vetter-mcp": {
"args": [
"openclaw-skill-vetter-mcp"
],
"command": "uvx"
}
}
}From the project's GitHub README.
MCP server for security-vetting third-party AI agent extensions before installation — Claude skills, ClawHub plugins, agent tool packs, any code-shaped artifact that runs in your agent environment with your API keys. 41 detection rules across prompt-injection patterns, hardcoded exfiltration channels (Discord/Slack/Telegram webhooks, SSH-key reads, AWS-creds reads), dangerous dynamic execution (
eval,exec,subprocess shell=True, pickle.loads), manifest/permission drift, and known typosquat dependencies. Outputs a 0-100 risk score + BLOCK/REVIEW/CAUTION/CLEAN bucket + per-finding evidence. Native ClawHub manifest support; the rule engine generalizes to any code-shaped extension via Custom MCP Build adapters. Keywords: AI agent security, plugin vetting, supply-chain security, prompt injection detection, MCP static analysis.
Third-party AI agent extensions — Claude skills, ClawHub plugins, MCP servers themselves, agent tool packs, npm-distributed agent code — are code that runs inside your environment with your API keys, your filesystem access, your network egress. Real attacks exist: the 2026 ClawHavoc campaign distributed hundreds of skills with prompt-injection payloads, hardcoded webhooks, and typosquatted dependencies. Per public post-mortem analysis: 36% of ClawHub skills carried injection patterns, 8% were actively exfiltrating data. The same shape of attack works against any third-party extension a user installs into their AI agent runtime.
This MCP server runs a battery of static-analysis scanners against any skill's directory and produces a single VetReport that an operator can act on:
> claude: vet the data-extractor skill before I install it.
[MCP tool: vet_skill]
Skill 'data-extractor': BLOCK — do not install.
Risk score: 100/100. Findings: 1 critical, 4 high, 1 info.
Critical:
EXFIL.WEBHOOK_DISCORD (extract.py:5) —
Hardcoded Discord webhook URL: 'https://discord.com/api/webhooks/...'
Recommendation: Refuse install unless explicitly justified.
High:
AST.OS_SYSTEM (extract.py:14) — os.system('curl ... | bash')
EXFIL.ENV_DUMP (extract.py:9) — dumps full os.environ
MANIFEST.WILDCARD_PERMISSION — `network.http: *`
...
Vet result for data-extractor: REFUSE INSTALL.
> claude: any flagged skills currently installed?
[MCP tool: flagged_skills_report]
2 skills flagged at REVIEW or BLOCK:
- data-extractor BLOCK risk_score=100 1 CRITICAL EXFIL.WEBHOOK_DISCORD
- markdown-formatter REVIEW risk_score=35 1 HIGH AST.EVAL_CALL on user input
openclaw-skill-vetter-mcpThree things existing tools (manual code review, generic SAST, ClawHub trust scores) don't do:
Skill-aware scanning. Generic SAST tools don't know what an OpenClaw skill manifest looks like. They miss the most common malware shape: a "calculator" skill that requests network.http: *. The vetter cross-checks declared purpose against requested permissions.
Risk score the operator can paste into a ticket. Not "high cyclomatic complexity" — BLOCK — Discord webhook at extract.py:5. Each finding has rule_id, file:line, evidence, and a specific recommendation.
Built for review-before-install, not after-the-fact audit. Run it from inside Claude on a skill you're about to add. Get a verdict in seconds. Refuse the install if it's BLOCK; sandbox-test if REVIEW; install if CLEAN.
Built for the production-AI operator who has been bitten (or doesn't want to be) by ClawHavoc-style supply-chain attacks.
| Tool | What it returns |
|---|---|
vet_skill | Full VetReport for one skill: risk_score, risk_level, sorted findings, summary |
vet_skill_directory | Aggregate report across every skill in the directory + per-bucket counts |
installed_skills_overview | Lightweight: just bucket counts + flagged skill IDs |
flagged_skills_report | Just REVIEW + BLOCK skills with their findings |
scan_for_prompt_injection | Focused: only prompt-injection findings on one skill |
scan_for_exfiltration | Focused: only exfiltration findings on one skill |
list_detection_rules | Catalog of every rule the server applies (transparency) |
Resources:
skill-vetter://overview — installed-skills risk overviewskill-vetter://flagged — currently-flagged skillsskill-vetter://rules — detection rules catalogPrompts:
pre-install-skill-check — vet a specific skill before installationweekly-skill-audit — compose a 200-word weekly audit of all installed skillspip install openclaw-skill-vetter-mcp
Add to ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json (macOS) or %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json (Windows):
{
"mcpServers": {
"openclaw-skill-vetter": {
"command": "python",
"args": ["-m", "openclaw_skill_vetter_mcp"],
"env": {
"OPENCLAW_SKILL_VETTER_BACKEND": "mock"
}
}
}
}
| Backend | Status | Description |
|---|---|---|
mock | ✅ v1.0 | 6 demo skills with deliberate findings spanning all severities — for protocol verification and README/CLI demos |
openclaw-skills-dir | ✅ v1.0 | Reads ~/.openclaw/skills/ (override via OPENCLAW_SKILLS_DIR); each subdirectory is parsed as one skill |
clawhub-fetch | ⏳ v1.1 | Fetches a candidate skill from the ClawHub registry directly for vet-before-install workflows |
Each skill directory contains a skill.yaml (or skill.json):
id: weather-fetch
name: Weather Fetch
version: 1.0.0
author: verified-publisher@openclaw.example
description: Fetches current weather for a city using OpenWeatherMap.
purpose: Live weather data lookup
runtime: python3.11
entry_point: main.py
permissions:
- network.http: api.openweathermap.org
dependencies:
- requests>=2.31
- pydantic>=2.0
signature: ed25519:abcd1234efgh5678
Plus the actual code files (*.py, *.js, *.ts, *.sh, *.rb, *.go, *.rs) and any prompt files (*.prompt, *.md, *.txt).
If your OpenClaw deployment uses a different on-disk shape, see the Custom MCP Build section below.
Four scanner modules cover the v1.0 ruleset:
Manifest — MANIFEST.MISSING, MANIFEST.PURPOSE_NETWORK_DRIFT, MANIFEST.WILDCARD_PERMISSION, MANIFEST.BROAD_FILESYSTEM_WRITE, MANIFEST.EMPTY_DESCRIPTION, MANIFEST.NO_AUTHOR, MANIFEST.UNSIGNED
Static patterns (text regex over code + prompts) —
PROMPT_INJ.IGNORE_PRIOR, PROMPT_INJ.ROLE_OVERRIDE, PROMPT_INJ.EXTRACT_SYSTEM, PROMPT_INJ.JAILBREAK_DAN, PROMPT_INJ.NEW_USER_MARKEREXFIL.WEBHOOK_DISCORD, EXFIL.WEBHOOK_SLACK, EXFIL.WEBHOOK_TELEGRAM, EXFIL.PASTEBIN_LITERAL, EXFIL.SSH_KEY_READ, EXFIL.AWS_CREDS_READ, EXFIL.ENV_DUMP, EXFIL.SUBPROCESS_CURLDYN_EXEC.SHELL_TRUE, DYN_EXEC.OS_SYSTEM, DYN_EXEC.EVAL_LITERAL, DYN_EXEC.EXEC_LITERAL, DYN_EXEC.PICKLE_LOADS, DYN_EXEC.DYNAMIC_IMPORTOBFUSCATION.LARGE_BASE64, OBFUSCATION.LARGE_HEXPython AST (catches what regex misses) — AST.EVAL_CALL, AST.EXEC_CALL, AST.COMPILE_CALL, AST.OS_SYSTEM, AST.OS_POPEN, AST.OS_EXECV, AST.SUBPROCESS_RUN_SHELL_TRUE, AST.SUBPROCESS_POPEN_SHELL_TRUE, AST.DYNAMIC_IMPORT
Dependencies — DEP.TYPOSQUAT, DEP.HOMOGLYPH, DEP.UNTRUSTED_GIT_SOURCE, DEP.LOCAL_PATH
Use list_detection_rules to query the live catalog.
Each finding contributes by severity:
| Severity | Weight |
|---|---|
| CRITICAL | 40 |
| HIGH | 15 |
| MEDIUM | 5 |
| LOW | 1 |
| INFO | 0 |
Final risk_score = min(sum, 100). Bucketing (first match wins):
| Bucket | Trigger |
|---|---|
| BLOCK | ≥1 CRITICAL or score ≥ 80 |
| REVIEW | ≥1 HIGH or score ≥ 50 |
| CAUTION | ≥1 MEDIUM or score ≥ 20 |
| CLEAN | no findings or only INFO |
Conservative-by-design: false positives are OK, missed criticals are not. If your operator workflow disagrees with a specific rule, you can filter by category on the client side, or fork + customize.
| Version | Scope | Status |
|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | mock + openclaw-skills-dir backends, 7 tools / 3 resources / 2 prompts, 4 scanner modules with 41 detection rules, GitHub Actions CI matrix, PyPI Trusted Publishing | ✅ |
| v1.1 | clawhub-fetch backend (vet a skill from ClawHub before install); CVE-DB lookup for dependencies; signature verification against ClawHub publisher keys | ⏳ |
| v1.2 | Sandbox-execution scanner (run skill in isolated process, observe network attempts); whitelist/allowlist per-operator | ⏳ |
| v1.x | Custom rule packs; integration with existing SAST tools; per-rule severity overrides | ⏳ |
If your AI deployment doesn't use the OpenClaw skill format — different agent harness, custom skill schema, monolithic skill files, internal-registry distribution — and you want the same vet-before-install discipline, that's a Custom MCP Build engagement.
| Tier | Scope | Investment | Timeline |
|---|---|---|---|
| Simple | Single backend adapter for your existing skill format | $8,000–$12,000 | 1–2 weeks |
| Standard | Custom backend + custom rule pack tuned to your ecosystem + CI integration | $15,000–$25,000 | 2–4 weeks |
| Complex | Multi-format ingestion + sandbox-execution + signed-publisher allowlist + rule-tuning workshop | $30,000–$45,000 | 4–8 weeks |
To engage:
Custom MCP Build inquiry — skill vettingThis server is part of a production-AI infrastructure MCP suite — companion to silentwatch-mcp, openclaw-health-mcp, and openclaw-cost-tracker-mcp. Install all four for full operational visibility.
If you're running production AI and want an outside practitioner to score readiness, find the failure patterns already present (ClawHavoc-style skill malware being one of the most damaging), and write the corrective-action plan:
| Tier | Scope | Investment | Timeline |
|---|---|---|---|
| Audit Lite | One system, top-5 findings, written report | $1,500 | 1 week |
| Audit Standard | Full audit, all 14 patterns, 5 Cs findings, 90-day follow-up | $3,000 | 2–3 weeks |
| Audit + Workshop | Standard audit + 2-day team workshop + first monthly audit included | $7,500 | 3–4 weeks |
Same email channel: temur@pixelette.tech with subject AI audit inquiry.
PRs welcome. Scanners are pluggable — see src/openclaw_skill_vetter_mcp/scanners/ for the contract.
To add a new scanner:
scanners/<your_scanner>.py exporting SCANNER_NAME: str and def scan(skill: Skill) -> list[Finding]def all_rules() -> list[tuple[...]] for the rules cataloganalysis.vet_skill (the orchestrator iterates over a fixed tuple of scanner modules)tests/test_scanners.pyTo add a new backend:
SkillBackend in backends/<your_backend>.pyget_skills, get_skill_by_id, get_directorybackends/__init__.pytests/test_backend_<your_backend>.pyBug reports + feature requests: open a GitHub issue. False-positive reports: include the skill snippet that fired the wrong rule and we'll tune.
MIT — see LICENSE.
LAUNCH50 for the first 30 days.Built by Temur Khan — independent practitioner on production AI systems. Contact: temur@pixelette.tech
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