Vdb MCP Server

vdb-mcp

mcp-name: kr.ai.vdb/vdb

MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for VDB — the AI-aware vulnerability database. Lets Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, Continue, and any MCP client check packages while generating code: known CVEs, slopsquatting (LLM-hallucinated package names an attacker may have registered), CISA KEV status, MCP-server trust profiles, and more.

Quick start

Where this works: Runs where your code is: an agent on your machine with the project folder (Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, Codex CLI). A chat-only web AI cannot use it — its sandbox has no outbound network, and it cannot see your files.

uvx vdb-mcp          # or: pipx run vdb-mcp

Claude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json) / Cursor (.cursor/mcp.json):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "vdb": { "command": "uvx", "args": ["vdb-mcp"] }
  }
}

No install at all — point any streamable-HTTP MCP client at the hosted endpoint:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "vdb": {
      "url": "https://vdb.ai.kr/mcp",
      "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer vdb_..." }
    }
  }
}

Claude Code: claude mcp add --transport http vdb https://vdb.ai.kr/mcp --header "Authorization: Bearer $VDB_API_KEY". The hosted endpoint reads the key from that header (0.2.3+; the vdbApiToken query parameter Smithery sets still works and takes precedence).

That's it — the server talks to the hosted instance at https://vdb.ai.kr by default. Every tool needs an API key (free at https://vdb.ai.kr/signup, or the agent can request one by email itself: without a key each tool answers agent_action: REFUSE with a request_key_url). Currently unmetered beyond abuse protection:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "vdb": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": ["vdb-mcp"],
      "env": { "VDB_API_TOKEN": "vdb_..." }
    }
  }
}

Tools

The three local-only tools need your files, so the hosted endpoint does not offer them — seven tools remote, ten with uvx vdb-mcp.

The vdb harden command

The same package installs the CLI behind the local tools, for use without an MCP client (0.2.2 or newer):

uvx --from vdb-mcp vdb harden app.py --manifest uv.lock   # analyze a call site
uvx --from vdb-mcp vdb harden --doctor                     # which of network / key / service is at fault
uvx --from vdb-mcp vdb harden ./src --manifest uv.lock --vex

Where PyPI is unreachable, https://vdb.ai.kr/v1/harden/client.pyz is the same CLI as one stdlib-only file (hash at /v1/harden/client.sha256): python3 client.pyz --doctor. Nothing to install.

Environment

No outbound DNS?

Sandboxes often allow egress but not name resolution. When — and only when — resolving vdb.ai.kr fails, the server retries against VDB_API_ADDR. That bypasses DNS and nothing else: the TLS handshake still presents the real hostname and validates its certificate, so a pinned connection is exactly as authenticated as a resolved one. HTTP errors, refused connections and timeouts are never retried — the name resolved, so the address would be the same box.

Why

LLMs hallucinate package names; attackers register them (slopsquatting). LLMs also happily recommend packages with known RCEs. VDB gives your agent a guardrail: one tool call before npm install / pip install. See https://vdb.ai.kr/connect for the one-line prompt variant that needs no MCP at all.

License

Elastic License 2.0 — free to use, including inside commercial organizations and CI. The only restrictions: you may not offer this software to third parties as a hosted or managed service, or resell it as a product. Commercial licensing beyond that: dev@egdee.com. API usage is governed by the VDB service terms regardless of how you call it.